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Article
GRATUITOUS PROMISES:  OVERSEEING ATHLETIC
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DUTY TO CARE
SAM C. EHRLICH*
We find it odd and disconcerting that organizations such as the appel-
lees, which undertake to enhance the quality and safety of high school foot-
ball games, disclaim that they do so to provide a service to the athletes who
participate in the games.  Moreover, we find similarly incongruous the argu-
ment that organizations whose rules govern the contest and whose discus-
sions determine the type of athletic equipment that the athletes are provided
do not owe those athletes a duty of reasonable care in their activities.  The
fact that these organizations purport to act gratuitously and for noble pur-
poses does not, ipso facto, absolve them of a legal duty of care toward the
athletes.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine spending time at a pool where a lifeguard stands
watch for safety.  If a swimmer were to lose his or her bearings and
begin to drown, the lifeguard would have a responsibility to jump
into the water to save that person.2  If the lifeguard shirked on that
duty, he or she would be legally responsible for that patron’s injury
or death.3  Similarly, the owners and supervisors of the pool who
hired the lifeguard to protect their customers would also be respon-
sible, and they would also be responsible if they promised to hire a
* Sam C. Ehrlich, J.D., Doctoral Student, Sport Management, Florida State
University.  The author would like to thank Ryan M. Rodenberg, John T. Holden,
and Josh D. Winneker for their continuing guidance, mentorship, and support.
1. Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 605 N.E.2d 458, 465 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992).
2. See generally Daniel P. Connaughton & John O. Spengler, Negligence Liability
in Public Swimming Pool Operations: A Review of Case Law Involving Supervision, 10 J.
LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 154 (2000).
3. See generally id.
(1)
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lifeguard but failed to do so.4  Those who take voluntary measures
to protect others—either for consideration or simply as a gratuitous
promise—are responsible for ensuring that those measures are car-
ried out successfully and that no additional harm comes to those
relying on those held duties.5
This concept, a legal theory known as the “voluntary undertak-
ing doctrine,” comes from section 323 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.6  This rule has been adopted in a majority of states, includ-
ing New York, California, Texas, and Florida.7  But what happens
when this doctrine is applied to overseeing athletic organizations
who do not directly oversee sporting events but still promulgate
safety rules, regulations, and policies in an effort to “enhance the
quality and safety” of games for athletes and participants?8  Would
those organizations be held to the same duty of care if these ath-
letes were injured by inconsistently applied or ineffective rules and
policies?
Traditionally, under the voluntary undertaking doctrine as
codified under section 323, such a duty would not exist as there
must be an increase of harm or evidence of reliance on the volun-
tary undertaking to show a legal duty.  However, a 1992 Ohio state
appellate court case, Wissel v. Ohio High School Athletic Association,9
showed that this duty could be enforced through other means.  In
this case, the court rejected the use of section 323 and instead ap-
plied section 324A—a “companion provision” to section 323—to
find that a duty existed due to the connection and influence that
the organization had over the host schools who do unequivocally
have a duty to these athletes.10  In this way, Wissel provided a
4. See generally Barnett v. Zion Park Dist., 665 N.E.2d 808 (Ill. 1996); S & C Co.
v. Horne, 235 S.E.2d 456 (Va. 1977).  This is assuming, of course, that sovereign
immunity does not apply. See generally Fluehr v. City of Cape May, 732 A.2d 1035
(N.J. 1999).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
6. See id.
7. See Coffee v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Cal. 1972)
(“The obligation assumed . . . is derived from the general principle expressed in
section 323 of the Restatement Second of Torts, that one who voluntarily under-
takes to perform an action must do so with due care.”); Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d
1035, 1050–51 (Fla. 2009); Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451, 460
(N.Y. 1980); Colonial Sav. Ass’n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116, 119–20 (Tex. 1979)
(finding that voluntary undertaking doctrine, as “stated in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 323” has “long been recognized by the courts of this State”).
8. See Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 605 N.E.2d at 465.
9. Id. at 465–66.
10. Id. at 466.
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blueprint for similar lawsuits against overseeing athletic organiza-
tions using this companion provision.
For the next twenty-five years, no plaintiff would attempt to sue
an overseeing athletic organization for their injuries under a similar
legal theory.  But in a sixteen-month timespan between July 2015
and December 2016, seven opinions in six cases heard in five differ-
ent courts have all attempted to pin a duty of care on overseeing
athletic organizations based on the voluntary undertaking doctrine.
These cases are:
Mehr v. Fe´deration Internationale de Football Association11
Lanni v. NCAA12
Mayall v. USA Water Polo, Inc.13
Hill v. Slippery Rock University14
McCants v. NCAA15
Schmitz v. NCAA16
In these six cases, the plaintiffs have argued that overseeing
athletic organizations owe athletes a duty of care in: (1) ensuring
that event organizers follow safety protocols;17 (2) creating policies
to safeguard against head injuries;18 (3) uniformly enforcing safety
policies;19 and (4) confirming that policies ensuring student-athlete
academic integrity are being enforced.20  However, only one of
these cases—Hill v. Slippery Rock University—was ultimately success-
11. 115 F. Supp. 3d 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  While the Fe´deration Internatio-
nale de Football Association (FIFA) is the first named defendant in this case, the
case disposition in regards to FIFA is irrelevant for the discussion in this Article as
the claims against FIFA (a Swiss organization), were dismissed solely due to lack of
personal jurisdiction, and FIFA’s potential liability under negligence theories was
never discussed. See id. at 1046–54.  Thus for the purposes of this Article, this case
will be referred to as Mehr v. US Soccer, et al. See infra notes 85–109 and accompany-
ing text.
12. 42 N.E.3d 542 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). See infra notes 110–128 and accompa-
nying text.
13. 174 F. Supp. 3d 1220 (C.D. Cal. 2016).  See infra notes 129–146 and ac-
companying text.
14. 138 A.3d 673 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016). See infra notes 147–165 and accompa-
nying text.
15. 201 F. Supp. 3d 732 (M.D.N.C. 2016). See infra notes 166–183 and accom-
panying text.
16. 67 N.E.3d 852 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).  See infra 184–194 and accompanying
text.
17. See, e.g., Lanni, 42 N.E.3d 542; Hill, 138 A.3d 673.
18. See, e.g., Mehr, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1035; Mayall, 174 F. Supp. 3d 1220; Schmitz,
67 N.E.3d 852.
19. See, e.g., Hill, 138 A.3d 673.
20. See, e.g., McCants, 201 F. Supp. 3d 732.
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ful in convincing the court that the defendant owed them a stan-
dard of care under traditional negligence theories.
This Article proposes a new theory of negligence liability for
overseeing athletic organizations based on subsection (b) of section
324A of the Restatement and the precedent established by Wissel.
While the courts in each of the discussed six cases had to decide
whether such conduct did, in fact, create an enforceable duty of
care or whether a broad duty to player safety simply amounted to
“aspirational statements” that “do not rise to the level of an assump-
tion of a legal duty,” the courts in most of these cases did not look
at the relationship between the overseeing athletic organization
and the athlete through the lenses established by the Wissel court.21
But if the plaintiffs had argued based on these theories, the out-
comes of these cases—and the consequent state of negligence lia-
bility in amateur sports—may have been vastly different.
Part II of this Article defines the current state of negligence
theory in amateur sports and finds that Wissel “opened the door” to
the possibility that overseeing athletic associations could be held to
a duty of care to their athletes.  Part III then summarizes the six
recent negligence cases that have all debated the possibility of ap-
plying a duty of care to several such athletic associations.  Finally,
Part IV explores common threads between these cases and applies
the legal theories advanced by Wissel to each case to determine
whether such theories are potentially applicable in these contexts.
II. NEGLIGENCE, DUTY, AND OVERSEEING ATHLETIC
ORGANIZATIONS
A. Negligence and Amateur Sports
The tort of negligence has four elements: a duty of care, a
breach of that duty of care, proximate and actual causation, and an
actual injury.22  However, the first element, duty of care, is often
seen an important “minimal threshold” that serves as a “legal re-
quirement for opening the courthouse doors.”23  As, for example,
21. Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., No. 14-10570, 2014 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 2,
at *30 (Ct. Com. Pl. Butler Cty. Dec. 22, 2014). See infra note 201 and accompany-
ing text.
22. See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003).
23. McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992) (internal
citation omitted) (emphasis in original). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 281(a). See also Maurer v. Cerkvenik-Anderson Travel, Inc., 890 P.2d 69, 71 (Ariz.
1994) (“To conclude there is ‘no duty’ is to conclude the defendant cannot be
liable, no matter the facts.”); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 760 (Cal.
1992) (“The threshold element of a cause of action for negligence is the existence
4
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the New York Court of Appeals has stated, “[i]n the absence of
duty, there is no breach and without breach there is no liability.”24
Analogously, in most states the existence of a duty is a question
of law for the court—not the jury—and often cases are dismissed or
granted summary judgment on this element even if the facts of the
case would support the plaintiff on the other three elements.25  For
example, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that finding a duty of
care “is not a factual matter; it is a legal matter to be determined
before the case-specific facts are considered.”26  The Texas Supreme
Court has found similarly, stating that the “existence of duty is a
question of law for the court to decide from the facts surrounding
the occurrence in question.”27
Different courts in different states have adopted various ways of
determining whether the defendant has a duty of care.  In Indiana,
courts determine the existence of a duty based on three factors:
“(1) the relationship between the parties, (2) the reasonable fore-
seeability of harm to the person injured, and (3) public policy con-
siderations.”28  In Ohio, a duty “may be established by common law,
statute, or by the particular facts and circumstances of a case.”29
California courts balance a number of factors, including:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the
injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defen-
dant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the
extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences
to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.30
of a duty to use due care toward an interest of another that enjoys legal protection
against unintentional invasion.”); Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 788 N.E.2d 1088,
1091 (Ohio 2003); Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995)
(“The threshold inquiry in a negligence case is whether the defendant owes a legal
duty to the plaintiff.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
24. Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1020 (N.Y. 1976) (internal citation
omitted).
25. See Steele v. City of Durham, 782 S.E.2d 331, 334 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016);
Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 269–70 (Ohio 1989).
26. Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 232 (Ariz. 2007) (citing Markowitz v. Ariz.
Parks Bd., 706 P.2d 364, 366 (Ariz. 1985)).
27. Centeq Realty, 899 S.W.2d at 197.
28. Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 1991).
29. Schmitz v. NCAA, 67 N.E.3d 852, 866 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (citing Cham-
bers v. St. Mary’s Sch., 697 N.E.2d 198, 201 (Ohio 1998)).
30. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
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The application of negligence to sports for entities hosting ath-
letic events is well-founded.31  Similarly, the topic of whether
schools—especially big-money NCAA universities—owe their stu-
dent-athletes a duty of care has been hotly debated,32 and case law
on the subject has both shifted over the years and has often varied
based on jurisdiction.33
B. Wissel Opens the Door
The first attempt to levy a duty of care onto an athletic associa-
tion was in Wissel v. Ohio High School Athletic Association, an Ohio
state court case.34  The plaintiff in Wissel was a former LaSalle High
School football player who had been rendered a quadriplegic dur-
ing a game.35  The plaintiff brought negligence and strict liability
claims against a number of different defendants, including the
manufacturer of the football helmet the student-athlete was wear-
ing, the coach of the football team, the Archdiocese of Cincinnati,
the Archbishop, and the Ohio High School Athletic Association
(“OHSAA”).36
The Ohio Court of Appeals reviewed a granted motion for
summary judgment by the OHSAA partially on the basis that be-
cause they were a “voluntary, non-profit organization[ ] whose
rules, regulations and/or standards were not mandatory upon their
members,” they did not owe a duty of care directly to the high
school student-athlete.37  This was in response to the plaintiff’s
claim, which was based mostly on section 323 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, also known as the “voluntary undertaking doc-
31. See Joy Blanchard, A Comparative Study of K-12 and Higher Education Sport-
Related Negligence Litigation, 6 J. STUDY SPORTS & ATHLETES EDUC. 201 (2012).
32. See James J. Hefferan, Jr., Note, Taking One for the Team: Davidson v. Univer-
sity of North Carolina and the Duty of Care Owed by Universities to Their Student-Athletes,
37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 589 (2002); Michelle D. McGirt, Comment, Do Universities
Have a Special Duty of Care to Protect Student-Athletes from Injury?, 6 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 219 (1999); Edward H. Whang, Comment, Necessary Roughness: Imposing a
Heightened Duty of Care on Colleges for Injuries of Student-Athletes, 2 SPORTS LAW. J. 25
(1995).
33. See Orr v. Brigham Young Univ., 108 F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. 1997);
Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll., 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993); Moose v. Mass. Inst.
of Tech., 683 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); Kennedy v. Syracuse Univ., 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13539 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1995).
34. 605 N.E.2d 458 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
35. See id. at 461.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 462.
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol25/iss1/1
2018] GRATUITOUS PROMISES 7
trine.”38  Under section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
in relevant part:
[O]ne who undertakes gratuitously or for consideration,
to render services to another . . . is subject to liability to
the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking if (a)
his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s
reliance on the undertaking.39
For this application, the court found that section 323 would
not apply to defendants such as the OHSAA, as proving a duty of
care under this doctrine requires proof that “the defendant’s al-
leged failure to exercise reasonable care either (a) increased the
risk of harm, or (b) induced detrimental reliance.”40
Since the defendants’ alleged “failure to take certain steps to
improve the safety of high school football” were “sins . . . of omis-
sion, not commission,” no duty of care could attach that purported
voluntary undertaking under section 323.41  The court found that
simply attempting to make the game safer was not enough to show
a voluntary undertaking, but instead, there must be evidence that
the OHSAA “by undertaking to make the game safer, actually made
it less safe than it was originally.”42  In the same way, no detrimental
reliance could be proven since there was no evidence that the high
school student “affirmatively relied on the actions or representa-
tions” of the association and thus “chose not to wear another, safer
helmet” or “played or tackled differently than he would normally
have done” if not for the association’s actions or representation.43
38. See id. at 464–65; see also John D. Risvold, The Voluntary Undertaking Doctrine
Explained, RISVOLD LAW (Jan. 2, 2013), https://risvoldlaw.com/2013/01/02/the-
voluntary-undertaking-doctrine-explained/ [https://perma.cc/492Z-D674].
39. Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 605 N.E.2d 458, 464–65 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).  While the court in
Wissel found that § 323 had “not been expressly adopted by the Ohio Supreme
Court,” it allowed its application as the Ohio Supreme Court had “cited [it] with
approval by the court in at least two cases.” Id. at 465 (citing Seley v. Searle & Co.,
423 N.E.2d 831, 839 n.7 (Ohio 1981); Briere v. Lathrop Co., 258 N.E.2d 597, 602
(Ohio 1970)).  To date, the Ohio Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on
§ 323. See Conte v. General Housewares Corp., 215 F.3d 628, 636 n.5 (6th Cir.
2000).  The Ohio Court of Appeals recently analyzed a negligence claim based on
§ 323 in Wheatley v. Marietta Coll., 48 N.E.3d 587, 617–18 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016),
suggesting its continued applicability in Ohio courts.
40. Wissel, 605 N.E.2d at 465.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 465–66.
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However, the Ohio appellate court was not willing to let the
OHSAA off the hook completely.  In a notable instance of the
judges taking the defendants to task in their decision, the court
made it clear that they took issue with the OHSAA attempting to
avoid owing a duty of care to their student-athletes, stating that it
was “odd and disconcerting that organizations such as the appel-
lees, which undertake to enhance the quality and safety of high
school football games, disclaim that they do so to provide a service
to the athletes who participate in the games.”44
The court also found it “similarly incongruous” that the defen-
dant athletic association, “whose rules govern the contest and
whose discussions determine the type of athletic equipment that
the athletes are provided,” do not owe a “duty of reasonable care in
their activities.”45  According to the court, just because organiza-
tions like the OHSAA “purport to act gratuitously and for noble
purposes,” they are not automatically “absolve[d] of a legal duty of
care towards the athletes.”46
As such, the court found that while section 323 did not apply
to the OHSAA’s actions towards the plaintiff high school student-
athlete, this did not completely absolve the OHSAA from owing a
duty of care.  Instead, the court found that the plaintiffs simply
used the wrong section of the Restatement.47
According to the court, because the plaintiffs brought up sec-
tion 323 in trying to pin a duty of care on the OHSAA, it must
“necessarily bring into consideration section 324A, the companion
provision to section 323.”48  Section 324A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts provides that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of a third person or his
things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care
to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the
risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the
third person, or
44. Id. at 465.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 465–66.
48. Id. at 466.
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(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other
or the third person upon the undertaking.49
Here, the court drew a line between the OHSAA and the plain-
tiff to find a duty of care under section 324A(b) of the Restate-
ment.50  The court found that the plaintiff was owed a general duty
of care by his high school “in the conduct of its football program.”51
In turn, the school “allowed the conduct of its football games to be
largely governed by the policies and decisions” of the OHSAA.52  As
the association was “cognizant of the role they served and the de-
gree to which their decisions were adopted,” a duty of care could
thus be applied under section 324A(b).53
This connection made from the plaintiff’s school to the OH-
SAA was never tested further in this case, as the plaintiff and the
OHSAA settled a few months later without an Ohio Supreme Court
ruling on the subject or a remanded decision in the trial courts.54
And oddly, the Wissel court’s novel application of section 324A(b)
has been rarely cited, and has yet to be cited by any courts in the
sports context.55  Thus, for the next twenty-five years, the question
of whether an overseeing body like the OHSAA could be responsi-
ble for a student-athlete’s injuries under section 324A would re-
main unsettled.
C. Defining Overseeing Athletic Organizations
Wissel is illustrative of when high school athletic associations
like the OHSAA can be held to a duty of care due to their influence
49. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(emphasis added)).
50. See id. at 466–67.
51. Id. at 466.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 595 N.E.2d 943 (Ohio 1992)
(dismissing plaintiff’s appeal to Supreme Court of Ohio on joint application).
55. See, e.g., Stevens v. Jeffrey Allen Corp., 722 N.E.2d 533, 538 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997) (citing Wissel to show that proof of any subsection of § 324A—including
subsection (b)—is sufficient to impose liability).  Notably, the Third Circuit cited
Wissel in the context of showing its view that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would find that a college owed its student-athlete a duty of care, but did not cite
§ 324A and in fact incorrectly stated that the Wissel court affirmed the trial court’s
summary judgment ruling. See Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll., 989 F.2d 1360,
1368–69 (3d Cir. 1993).  Interestingly, this is not the only time that a court has
misinterpreted the final ruling of Wissel. See Alder v. Bayer Corp., 61 P.3d 1068,
1078 (Utah 2002) (citing Wissel as illustrative of § 324A but incorrectly stating the
case held “under section 324A that state high school athletic association was not
liable to athlete injured in football game”).
9
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on those who are directly responsible for those athletes.  But many
other overseeing athletic organizations fit this same description.
In Wissel, the court found that the OHSAA did not create risk
management protocols for member schools but did strongly influ-
ence their adoption.56  The Ohio Court of Appeals took particular
note of this, stating that since the plaintiff’s school “allowed the
conduct of its football games to be largely governed by the policies
and decisions” and the OHSAA was “cognizant of the role they
served and the degree to which their decisions were adopted,” the
OHSAA’s influential policy-making role may constitute a voluntary
undertaking required to institute a duty of care under section
324A(b) of the Restatement.57
Nearly twenty-five years after Wissel was decided, most high
school athletic associations still serve similar roles as the OHSAA.
The OHSAA continues to implement risk management policies
that member schools must follow.58  For example, the 2016–17 OH-
SAA football regulations includes rules regarding when practices
with pads are and are not allowed, limitations for practicing in ex-
treme heat conditions and inclement weather, and gameplay limita-
tions for younger students.59  Penalties for not following these
bylaws can include suspension, forfeiture of games, forfeiture of
championship rights, probation, fines up to $10,000, or any other
penalties “as the Commissioner deems appropriate.”60
Other state high school athletic associations, including Ala-
bama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, New York, and Washington have
similar policies.61  Dozens of other states, including the OHSAA,
56. See Wissel, 605 N.E.2d at 465.
57. Id. at 466.
58. See OHIO HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, BYLAWS, 38 (May 2016) [hereinafter
“OHSAA BYLAWS”], available at http://ohsaa.org/Portals/0/About-the-OHSAA/
Bylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PK4-ERLL] (“Interscholastic competition shall be
conducted using contest rules adopted by the [OHSAA] Board of Directors. Modi-
fications or changes in sport rules are not permitted except those provided in the
rule book and approved by the Board of Directors.”).
59. See OHIO HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, FOOTBALL GENERAL REGS, 115–16,
[hereinafter “OHSAA FOOTBALL GENERAL REGULATIONS”], available at http://oh-
saa.org/Portals/0/Sports/Football/ftregs.pdf [https://perma.cc/4678-2449]. See
OHSAA Lightning & Inclement Weather Policy, OHIO HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N,
http://ohsaa.org/sports/inclementweatherpolicy [https://perma.cc/SC6L-
5X96].
60. OHSAA BYLAWS, supra note 58, at 11.
61. See ALABAMA HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2016-2017 SPORTS, 91, available at
http://www.ahsaa.com/Portals/0/Publications/2016-17/Online%20version%20
2016-17%20Handbook.pdf?ver=2017-02-15-151143-537 [https://perma.cc/H6XV-
CEVC]. See ALASKA SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, 2016-17 ASAA HANDBOOK, 36, 43, [here-
inafter ASAA HANDBOOK] available at http://asaa.org/wp-content/uploads/hand-
book/1617handbook/asaa/complete/2016-2017-ASAA-Handbook.pdf [https://
10
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also adopted the recommendations of the National Federation of
State High School Associations (NFHS) and implemented rules re-
quiring physical examinations and acclimation periods and restrict-
ing preseason and in-season practices in order to minimize the risk
of concussions.62  Because these private associations have some
measure of control (either through imposed rules and regulations
or by strong recommendations) over rules regarding player safety,
this rule-making authority would thus create a duty of care if other
courts were to follow section 324A(b) as applied by the Wissel
court.63
perma.cc/M4NG-3Y32].  Alaska also has various “mandatory” rules regulating par-
ticipation, including regulations prohibiting baseball student-athletes from pitch-
ing more than ten innings in a three-day period prohibiting basketball and
football student-athletes from participating in more than six quarters of play per
day. See id. at 120, 124, 143. See ARIZONA INTERSCHOLASTIC ASS’N, AIA BYLAWS, 76,
available at http://aiaonline.org/files/73/article-23-football.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KN7E-KGKA]. See COLORADO HIGH SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, CONSTITU-
TION OF THE COLORADO HIGH SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N § 3310, available at http://rca
sey.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/bylaws/2016-17-bylaws.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LYQ8-4JLM]. See NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC
ASS’N, HIGH SCH. SPORTS STANDARDS, available at http://www.nysphsaa.org/Por-
tals/0/PDF/Handbook/2016-17%20Handbook/Sports%20Standards_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LYL7-DF76]. See WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES
ASS’N, SPECIFIC SPORT RULES AND REGS., 60–62, available at http://www.wiaa.com/
ConDocs/Con1629/Specific%20Sport-Activity%20Rules%20(55-69).pdf [https://
perma.cc/H5NH-T68D].
62. See Press Release, Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, OHSAA Adopts National
Recommendations for Minimizing Concussion Risks in Football Practice (July 13,
2015), available at http://ohsaa.org/Portals/0/Sports/Football/FootballPractice
Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QPD-XKTW]. See also 2016–17 ASAA HAND-
BOOK, 146–47, supra note 61 (stating ASAA “strongly recommends” to its member
districts and schools to adopt the NFHS recommendations); Press Release, Fla.
High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, FHSAA Concussion Action Plan (June 2013), available at
http://www.fhsaa.org/sites/default/files/orig_uploads/health/pdf/fhsaa_concus
sion_action_plan_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2ZF-CA7M].
63. This would not apply to high school athletic associations which are by
statute given state legislative power, because these associations would be protected
by sovereign immunity principles. See Miulli v. Florida High Sch. Athletic Ass’n,
998 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Section 1006.20 of the Florida Statutes, titled ‘Athletics in public K-12
schools,’ provides FHSAA with the exclusive authority to adopt bylaws re-
lating to student participation in interscholastic athletic teams.  Nothing
in the statute indicates that the Florida Legislature intended to create a
private cause of action for individuals based upon the FHSAA’s failure to
enact or enforce bylaws.
Id.  Pierscionek v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 2015 Ill. Cir. LEXIS 24, at *5–*6 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 27, 2015) (finding that “no recognized cause of action for negligence by an
individual against a governmental entity” and that “ ‘negligent rulemaking’ is not a
cause of action” against such government entities). See also Isler v. N.M. Activities
Ass’n, 893 F.Supp. 2d 1145, 1155–56 (D.N.M. 2012) (ruling that governing high
school athletic association in New Mexico is a governmental entity for purposes of
New Mexico Tort Claims Act and thus is protected by sovereign immunity); Yanero
v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 530 (Ky. 2001) (finding that since Kentucky High School
11
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Other amateur athletic associations like the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and national Olympic sport
governing bodies also fit these criteria.64  While Article 2 of the
NCAA bylaws pushes responsibility to “each member institution to
protect the health of, and provide a safe environment for, each of
its participating student-athletes,” the NCAA and its conferences
have a number of safety provisions in their bylaws that member in-
stitutions must follow.65  If these rules are not followed, the NCAA
Committee on Infractions has the power to impose sanctions on the
responsible individuals and schools.66
For example, Article 3.2.4.18 of the NCAA Bylaws requires
member institutions to submit a Concussion Safety Protocol to the
NCAA Concussion Safety Protocol Committee each year, and the
bylaw also prescribes a number of different requirements for what
Athletic Association is “an agent of the Kentucky Board of Education and, in that
capacity, functions the same as if the Board had designated an individual . . . to
manage interscholastic athletics . . . the KHSAA is entitled to the qualified official
immunity available to officers and employees of the state”); Univ. Interscholastic
League v. Sw. Officials Ass’n, 319 S.W.3d 952, 962 (Tex. App. 2010).
[W]e are dealing here with an entity that is required by statute to imple-
ment state education policies, granted rulemaking and enforcement
power over such policies, subjected to extensive oversight from the legis-
lative and executive branches, and statutorily classified as a component
part of a governmental unit that was created by the Texas Constitution.
For these reasons, we hold that the UIL is a governmental unit subject to
sovereign immunity.
Id.  Other state courts, including Iowa and Ohio, have definitively held that high
school athletic associations are not sovereign entities. See Coughlon v. Iowa High
Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 150 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 1967).
Even though it be conceded this unincorporated association is not a legal
entity separate and apart from its members it is still a matter of common
knowledge that various parochial schools, not enjoying governmental im-
munity, are members of and participate in the affairs of defendant organ-
ization.  This alone would preclude any possible immunity by delegation
or representation.
Id.  Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 605 N.E.2d 458, 462 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992) (finding that sovereign immunity is not applicable to a “quasi governmental
body” like a high school athletic association).
64. Four of the cases discussed in this Article involve the NCAA as a defen-
dant.  Two of the cases discussed in this Article involve national Olympic governing
bodies as a defendant.
65. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2016-17 DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 2.2.3
(2016) [hereinafter “2016–17 NCAA MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapubli
cations.com/productdownloads/D117.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6P3-MBBE]. See
id. at art. 19.01.2 (“The infractions program shall hold institutions, coaches, ad-
ministrators and student-athletes who violate the NCAA constitution and bylaws
accountable for their conduct, both at the individual and institutional levels.”).
66. See Enforcement Process: Investigations, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/enforcement-process-investigations
[https://perma.cc/3R4T-5Z9A].
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must be in that concussion safety plan.67  The NCAA also requires
football strength and conditioning coaches to be certified in first
aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation and forces member institu-
tions to ensure that sports medicine staff members present during
workouts have the authority to cancel or modify workouts at any
time for health and safety reasons.68
Furthermore, the NCAA also has a Committee on Competitive
Safeguards and Medical Aspects of Sports, whose duties include
“(a) [p]romot[ing] and sponsor[ing] research to address relevant
health and safety issues; (b) [p]romot[ing] education to enhance
the health and safety of student-athletes . . . (e) [f]acilitat[ing] out-
reach activities to enhance student-athlete health and safety; and
(f) [p]rovid[ing] a health and safety perspective on relevant legisla-
tion and policy.”69  The NCAA also makes it clear on its website that
its safety guidelines and playing rules are designed “to minimize
risks and give student-athletes the opportunity to enjoy a healthy
career.”70
NCAA conferences also have safety rules that would hold them
to this definitional standard.  At the urging of the NCAA, most
NCAA Division I conferences have created rules and policies
prohibiting court- and field-storming at basketball and football
games to protect players and coaches who may still be present on
the court or field.71  The NCAA also has a similar rule prohibiting
court- and field-storming during its Championship events.72
Many national Olympic sports governing bodies also hold their
member institutions to similar standards.  For example, USA Track
and Field (“USATF”) sanctions competitive track and field, long-
67. See 2016–17 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 65, at art. 3.2.4.18.
68. See id. at art. 13.11.3.7.4; 13.11.3.8.2; 17.1.6; 17.1.7.2.1.4; 17.10.6.3.
69. Id. at art. 21.2.2.2.
70. Well-Being, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/
health-and-safety [https://perma.cc/R2MU-7KRQ] (last visited May 30, 2017).
71. See Joshua D. Winneker & Sam C. Ehrlich, The Calm Before the (Court) Storm:
Potential Fan Liability and the NCAA’s Necessary Response, 27 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
425, 433–34 (2017); Marcus Misinec, When the Game Ends, the Pandemonium Begins:
University Liability for Field-Rushing Injuries, 12 SPORTS L.J. 181 (2005).  For example,
the Southeastern Conference (SEC) has the authority to impose fines of up to
$250,000 to member institutions who allow court storming. See David Ching, Fines
Could Reach $250,000 for Fans Storming Competition Area, ESPN (May 29, 2015),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/12977211/sec-passes-tougher-
fines-court-storming [https://perma.cc/D82X-Y25E].
72. See Winneker & Ehrlich, supra note 71, at 434; Marc Tracy, Storming the
Court, a Cherished Rite, Can Be a Danger, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/03/05/sports/ncaabasketball/storming-the-court-a-cher
ished-rite-can-be-a-danger.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/LUA8-KQ3A].
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distance running, and race walking events in the United States.73
According to their website, a USATF sanction “is also a contract,
which evidences the event’s commitment to follow national and in-
ternational rules and regulations of the sport and to provide a safe
environment for the participants and spectators.”74  Such regula-
tions include establishing that “proper medical supervision will be
provided for athletes who will participate in the competition; and
. . . proper safety precautions have been taken to protect the per-
sonal welfare of the athletes and spectators at the competition.”75
At the same time, the U.S. Olympic Committee would likely
not fit into this category, as they do not promulgate rules for indi-
vidual sports and instead leave it to each sport’s national governing
body to create, enforce, and adjudicate safety rules.76  Likewise, in-
73. See Online Event Sanctioning, USA TRACK & FIELD, http://www.usatf.org/
Products—-Services/Event-Sanctions.aspx [https://perma.cc/WTF7-8876] (last
visited May 30, 2017).
74. Id.
75. USA TRACK & FIELD, 2016 GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK, 96 (2016). As shown
in Lanni v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), the U.S. Fencing Asso-
ciation has similar safety rules, including a requirement for a pipe-and-drape bar-
rier to protect spectators that was not implemented in Lanni. See infra notes
110–128 and accompanying text. See also USA FENCING, RULES FOR COMPETITION,
8–9 (Aug. 1, 2016), available at http://assets.ngin.com/attachments/document/01
05/8552/2016-USA-Fencing-Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHL4-WXAE].  Other
national Olympic sport governing bodies do not have these requirements for sanc-
tioned events.  For example, for its sanctioned events USA Water Polo provides
medical insurance coverage, requires participants to sign a waiver, and requires
that competitions follow certain playing rules, but they do not require adherence
to any health and safety rules or guidelines aside from a suspended game policy
requiring that games be halted in unsafe weather conditions. See USA WATER
POLO, EVENT SANCTION TERMS AND CONDITIONS, available at http://grfx.cstv.com/
photos/schools/uswp/genrel/auto_pdf/2016-17/misc_non_event/EventSanction
_Terms_Conditions.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW8P-N72H]; Suspended Games,
USA WATER POLO, http://www.usawaterpolo.org/resources/suspended-games.
html [https://perma.cc/QX4Y-SXC9] (last visited May 30, 2017).  In fact, on the
“Safety” page of USA Water Polo’s website, the organization provides health guide-
line posters that merely “can” be posted at practices and game facilities or distrib-
uted to club members. See Safety, USA WATER POLO, http://www.usawater
polo.org/resources/head-injuries.html [https://perma.cc/VE7G-J9UC] (last vis-
ited May 30, 2017).  It is likely not a coincidence that USA Water Polo was recently
a successful defendant in recent litigation where the mother of an athlete who
suffered a concussion at one of these sanctioned events tried to hold the governing
body to a duty of care based on “the general existence of a return-to-play policy.”
Mayall v. USA Water Polo, No. 8:15-cv-00171-AG-KES, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115047, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
76. See UNITED STATES OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, BYLAWS OF THE U.S. OLYMPIC COM-
MITTEE, § 9.12, available at http://www.teamusa.org/~/media/Bios/USOC-Bylaws-
effective-June-30-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY6G-5P9K] (“A decision concern-
ing a safe sport rule violation adjudicated by the independent safe sport organiza-
tion designated by the corporation to investigate and resolve safe sport violations
shall not be reviewable through, or the subject of, these complaint procedures.”).
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ternational organizations like international sport governing bodies
(including Fe´deration Internationale de Football Association) and
the International Olympic Committee would expect to have suits
against them dismissed for a lack of personal jurisdiction.77
Also not held to this definition are professional sports leagues.
Most professional sports leagues have a collective bargaining agree-
ment (CBA).78  Under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, the rights and duties of labor and management that are cre-
ated by collective bargaining “should ordinarily trump common law
remedies.”79  This preemption generally includes collectively bar-
gained provisions involving health and safety.80
In fact, a California United States District Court analyzing this
question in 2014 found “no case law that has imposed upon a sports
league a common law duty to police the health-and-safety treatment
of players by the clubs.”81  The court held that to find out whether a
professional sports leagues operating under a CBA breached duties
to protect their athletes, the court “would need to consult, con-
strue, and apply what was required by the CBA provision” involving
the health and safety rule under dispute.82
77. See Mehr v. US Soccer, et al., 115 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1046–54 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (granting FIFA’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on both
general and specific jurisdiction theories).
78. See, e.g., MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS
ASSOCIATION, 2012-2016 BASIC AGREEMENT, available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/
pdf/cba_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZT7-XENB]; NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE
AND NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,
available at https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/Gen-
eral/2011_Final_CBA_Searchable_Bookmarked.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL7P-
VQA5]; MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER AND MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER PLAYERS UNION, COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER AND MAJOR
LEAGUE SOCCER PLAYERS UNION, available at https://www.mlsplayers.org/images/
Collective%20Bargaining%20Agreement%20-%20February%201,%202015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/85FC-KDT7]; Budd Bailey, NLL, Players Agree to Seven-Year Deal,
BUFFALO NEWS (Oct. 22, 2013), http://buffalonews.com/2013/10/22/nll-players-
agree-to-seven-year-deal/ [https://perma.cc/A7YK-N3LV] (reporting on collective
bargaining agreement between National Lacrosse League and the Professional La-
crosse Players’ Association).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 185. See Dent v. NFL, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 174448, at *6–*7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).  This could conceivably change,
as this case is currently under review in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The
Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments on December 15, 2016.  Oral Arguments. Dent
v. NFL, No. 15-15143 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2016) http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/me-
dia/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000010751 [https://perma.cc/9APM-Z7PW].
80. See Dent, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174448, at *12 (“In evaluating any possible
negligence by the NFL as alleged in the operative pleading, it would be necessary
to take into account what the NFL has affirmatively done to address the problem,
not just what it has not done.”).
81. Id. at *11.
82. Id. at *22.
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Therefore, any negligence claim by a professional athlete cov-
ered by a CBA would likely be preempted by § 301.  For this reason,
the theories advanced by this Article will be limited to amateur
sports.83
III. RECENT NEGLIGENCE CASES INVOLVING OVERSEEING ATHLETIC
ORGANIZATIONS AS DEFENDANTS
For almost twenty-five years after Wissel, no published decisions
attempted to solve the question as to whether these overseeing ath-
letic organizations owe their athletes a duty of care.84  But in a six-
teen-month span between July 2015 and December 2016, six
opinions have all dealt with this very issue and have reopened the
debate over overseeing athletic organization liability to athletes
under their care.  These opinions will be discussed in this section.
A. Mehr v. Fe´deration Internationale de Footbal Association
On August 27, 2014, a proposed class action lawsuit was filed by
seven soccer players alleging Fe´deration Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA), U.S. Soccer, the U.S. Youth Soccer Organiza-
tion (“USYSA”), the California Youth Soccer Association (“CYSA”),
the National Association of Competitive Soccer Clubs (“U.S. Club
Soccer”), and the American Youth Soccer Organization (“AYSO”)
had each failed to provide adequate concussion management to re-
duce the risk of preventable injuries resulting from concussions and
repetitive heading.85  In this class action, the plaintiffs asked the
court to “compel defendants to adopt and enforce rules that would
reduce” the risk of concussions in youth soccer.86
83. This Article does not discuss the possibility of a duty of care owed by pro-
fessional sports organizations whose athletes operate as independent contractors,
not employees. See generally Mookie Alexander, TJ Dillashaw: UFC ‘Treat Us like
Employees, but They Don’t Give Us Benefits like Employees’, SBNATION (July 16, 2016),
http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2016/7/16/12206006/tj-dillashaw-ufc-treat-us-like-
employees-but-they-dont-give-us-employee-benefits-mma-news [https://perma.cc/
74GL-S34K].  This is an interesting question that could be the subject of another
article, though in most cases § 324A would likely not be necessary since such orga-
nizations have direct oversight over events and the athletes.
84. A 2008 Florida District Court of Appeals decision touched on this issue
but was wholly decided on the Florida High School Athletic Association’s duties as
a government legislative organization, not as a private athletic association. See Mi-
ulli v. Florida High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 998 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Another 2015 Illinois state court decision was dismissed on similar grounds. See
Pierscionek v. Illinois High Sch. Ass’n, No. 14-CH-19131, 2015 Ill. Cir. LEXIS 24
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 27, 2015). See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
85. See Mehr v. US Soccer, et al., 115 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
86. Id. at 1044 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol25/iss1/1
2018] GRATUITOUS PROMISES 17
While the claims against FIFA, a Swiss organization, were
quickly dismissed based on a lack of personal jurisdiction, the court
analyzed the plaintiffs’ negligence claims based on the seven de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss for a failure to state a claim.87  For their
negligence claim, the plaintiffs argued that “ ‘each defendant’ acted
negligently in its position as a regulatory body for soccer and soccer
players,” and U.S. Soccer, the governing body for soccer in the
United States, “knew that through the power of the Laws of the
Game they had the power to direct and influence how the rest of
the defendants treat concussion management issues.”88  By “failing
to promulgate rules and regulations to adequately address the dan-
gers of repeated concussions and accumulation of subconcussive
hits,” the plaintiffs alleged that U.S. Soccer breached a duty of care
owed to the plaintiffs as “[i]t was reasonable and foreseeable to
FIFA and U.S. Soccer that their failures would flow downstream to
the Rules and Laws of the Game enacted by other organizations,
including the other [d]efendants in this action.”89
Here, the court found that the plaintiffs had pled “no facts
showing that any defendant breached any legal duty of care owed to
any plaintiff” and dismissed the complaint.90  Citing the controlling
sports negligence case in California, Knight v. Jewett,91 the court
held that there is “no duty to prevent risks that are ‘inherent in the
sport itself,’ and that the duty owed by a defendant depends on the
defendant’s role or relationship to the sport.”92  Further, the court
noted that the plaintiffs “have acknowledged that ‘injuries’ are a
‘part of soccer’” and that heading, which the plaintiffs claim causes
“at least 30% of the concussions in soccer[,] . . . is ‘a legal and
encouraged maneuver’ in soccer.”93
But beyond this, the court also noted the plaintiffs’ argument
for negligence based on the voluntary undertaking doctrine under
the theory that, by “failing to promulgate rules and regulations to
adequately address the dangers of repeated concussions and ac-
cumulation of subconcussive hits,” the defendants breached a duty
87. See id. at 1046–55 (discussing motion to dismiss for lack of personal juris-
diction); id. at 1061–62 (discussing motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
See also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
88. Mehr, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1062 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Complaint) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
90. Id. at 1063.
91. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
92. Mehr v. US Soccer, et al., 115 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(citing Knight, 834 P.2d at 708).
93. Id. at 1064 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
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of care owed to the plaintiffs.94  Here, the court conducted a claim
for each defendant based on the plaintiffs’ allegations and each de-
fendant’s specific conduct and defenses.95
For U.S. Soccer, the plaintiffs asserted that while the governing
body had “created a ‘Concussion Management Program’ to provide
education, evaluation, and management of concussions among ‘na-
tional team players,’” this was inadequate due to their failure to
“adopt the consensus guidelines promulgated by the ‘International
Conferences on Concussion in Sport’” and their failure to “man-
date its Concussion Management Program beyond elite athletes to
all participants.”96  According to the plaintiffs, U.S. Soccer had vol-
untarily assumed a duty of care because it “has undertaken broad
responsibility for setting and enforcing the Laws of the Game, and
because it has the power to direct and influence how the rest of the
defendants treat concussion management issues.”97  However, the
court found this argument insufficient to survive a motion to dis-
miss, as creating a Concussion Management Plan for its national
team players did not create a duty to the rest of the sport, and thus
the plaintiffs had “identified no facts in their opposition that sup-
port a claim that U.S. Soccer has specifically undertaken to take
actions to eliminate risks inherent in the sport of soccer or to re-
duce the risk of injury from improper concussion management.”98
For the USYSA, the plaintiffs argued that the organization’s
failure to “adopt any consensus guidelines (including its own proto-
col) for members or tournaments other than the Championship
Series tournament” was a breach of duty to participants in USYSA
events aside from the Championship Series tournament.99  Further,
the plaintiffs argued that even for the Championship Series tourna-
ment, the concussion management protocols adopted “fail[ed] to
adopt the consensus guidelines” and the organization “at most, sim-
ply provide[d] informational links on its website” in substitute for
an adequate concussion management plan.100  Despite this incon-
sistency in applied policy, the court found that these facts were in-
sufficient to support a voluntary undertaking claim, as the plaintiffs
did not plead facts sufficient to show that the USYSA had “specifi-
cally undertaken to take actions to eliminate risks inherent in the
94. Id. at 1064–65 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
95. See id. at 1065–70.
96. Id. at 1065–66 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
97. Id. at 1066 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1066–67 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
100. Id. at 1067 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
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sport of soccer” or “specifically assumed an obligation to change
the Laws of the Game or other unspecified rules pertaining to the
game, or to restrict heading.”101
For the AYSO, the plaintiffs argued that the organization had
only adopted a concussion management policy in 2009 when they
implemented a “‘national policy statement’ regarding concussion
awareness and safety” and “partnered with the [Center for Disease
Control] to create a Concussion Action Plan for coaches.”102  The
plaintiffs also argue that the AYSO’s policy was still “deficient be-
cause it fails to adopt the consensus ‘best practices’ of the Interna-
tional Conferences.”103  The court found that these alleged actions
were insufficient to support a voluntary undertaking claim, as the
plaintiffs “identified no facts . . . that support a claim that AYSO has
specifically undertaken to adopt or implement the consensus guide-
lines . . . or to take actions to eliminate risks inherent in the sport of
soccer or to reduce the risk of injury from improper concussion
management.”104
Finally, for U.S. Club Soccer the plaintiffs alleged that the or-
ganization had “failed to adopt any consensus guidelines promul-
gated by the International Conferences on Concussion in Sport”
and the extent of their concussion management policy was “refer-
enc[ing] a link to its concussion guidelines and provides links to
informational materials” on its website.105  Here, the court noted
that U.S. Soccer only argued based on the inherent risk to the sport
argument, and did not “specifically argue that plaintiffs have not
alleged facts showing that it assumed a duty to enforce the recom-
mendations in the Consensus Statements or to limit risks inherent
in the sport of soccer.”106  However, the court still found that the
plaintiffs did not plead facts sufficient to support a claim of a volun-
tary undertaking by this defendant, as they had “identified no facts
in their opposition that support a claim that U.S. Club Soccer has
specifically undertaken to adopt or implement the consensus guide-
lines drafted by the International Conferences on Sport,” or to take
any action to eliminate inherent risks of soccer or to change the
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
103. Id. (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
104. Id. at 1068 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
105. Id. (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint).  Not all of the representative plaintiffs
sued all of the defendants.  Here, only Rachel Mehr, the lead plaintiff, asserted
claims against US Club Soccer. Id.
106. Id. at 1068–69.
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Laws of the Game to better manage the risk of harm from
concussions.107
Based on these analyses for each defendant, the court dis-
missed all of the negligence claims.108  The court did not cite sec-
tion 324A nor consider any arguments based on that theory.109
B. Lanni v. NCAA
In March 2010, Lydia Lanni, a fencing student-athlete for
Wayne State University, competed in a fencing competition at No-
tre Dame University.110  After the conclusion of one of her bouts,
she stood in a designated waiting area next to a fencing strip where
another bout was taking place.111  While standing in this designated
area, Lanni was struck by one of the other fencer’s sabres across the
bridge of her nose, resulting in a severe injury to her eye.112
In February 2012, Lanni sued the NCAA, the United States
Fencing Association (“USFA”) and Notre Dame for negligence.113
While the competition was not run specifically by the NCAA, Lanni
charged that the NCAA, acting through its “agents, including, but
not limited to[,] the NCAA Men’s and Women’s Fencing Commit-
tee and regional advisory committees, were responsible . . . for the
operations” of the competition.114  She further charged that the
NCAA was negligent by “failing to undertake hazard and risk
analys[e]s” before the competition and by failing to supervise quali-
fied officials and the competition hosts.115  The court also pointed
out that a “Visiting Team/Club Guide” published by Notre Dame
107. Id. at 1069.
108. See id. at 1071.  The judge did dismiss the voluntary undertaking claims
with leave to amend “to the extent that plaintiffs can allege facts as to each defen-
dant showing that the defendant voluntarily assumed a duty with respect to a spe-
cific plaintiff or plaintiffs.” Id.  Before any amended complaint was filed, however,
the dismissal was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and subsequently
voluntarily dismissed by joint stipulation of the parties about one month after the
notice of appeal was filed.  USCA Mandate at 1, Mehr v. Fe´deration Intern. de
Football Ass’n, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 14-cv-3879-PJH).
109. Nor did the court cite the California Supreme Court cases that adopted
§ 324A as California law. See Artiglio v. Corning Inc., 957 P.2d 1313, 1314 (Cal.
1998) (“California courts, including this court, have long recognized section
324A’s negligent undertaking theory, the general viability which is not at issue.”);
Paz v. State, 994 P.2d 975, 977 (Cal. 2000) (“[T]he section 324A theory of liability
. . . is a settled principle firmly rooted in the common law of negligence.”).
110. See Lanni v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542, 545–46 (Ind. App. Ct. 2015).
111. See id. at 546.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 546–47 (quoting plaintiff’s complaint).
115. Id.
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displayed the NCAA logo, and that the competition scoresheets and
rosters carried the NCAA logo.116
In arguing that the NCAA owed her a duty of care, Lanni
pointed to the NCAA Constitution, which states that NCAA compe-
tition rules “shall apply to all teams in sports recognized by the
member institutions as varsity intercollegiate sports.”117  She also re-
ferred the court to the NCAA website, where the NCAA states that it
“takes appropriate steps to modify safety guidelines, playing rules[,]
and standards to minimize those risks and provide student[-]ath-
letes with the best opportunity to enjoy a healthy career.”118  Lanni
also cited testimony by NCAA Coordinator of Championships and
Alliances, Eric Breece, who said that “ ‘any serious injury’ at an
NCAA event ‘is unacceptable if reasonable safety measures could
prevent’ the injury.”119  Finally, the plaintiff argued that the safety
document in question, the USFA Rules, was simply the NCAA Fenc-
ing Rule Book “with some modifications,” and since the USFA
Rules “as adopted by the NCAA were required to be followed for
the purposes of intercollegiate fencing competitions, including the
subject competition for which Lanni was injured,” the NCAA
should be held to a duty of care to enforce those rules.120
In its analysis, the court cited that under the NCAA’s “Fencing
Meet Procedures,” “member institutions shall conduct all of their
intercollegiate competition[s] in accordance with the playing rules
of the [NCAA] in all sports for which the NCAA develops playing
rules.”121  In this case, the NCAA adopted the playing rules of the
USFA, including a diagram of a fencing area with a border around
each of the four fencing strips that represent, according to USFA
Executive Director, Robert Dilworth, in his testimony, “a series of
pipes that delineate where spectators may or may not go.”122
The court found that like the USFA, the NCAA also required a
pipe-and-drape barrier in order to “provide[ ] space around the
strip so that only the fencer[s] and the referee are in [the fencing]
area,” and according to Breece’s testimony, the NCAA also through
the NCAA Fencing Committee conducted inspections and walk-
116. Id. at 545–46.
117. Id. at 544 (quoting Plaintiff’s Appendix).
118. Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s Appendix).
119. Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s Appendix).
120. Consolidated Reply Brief of Appellant at 16–17, Lanni v. NCAA, 42
N.E.3d 542 (Ind. Ct. App. June 8, 2015) (No. 49A02-1409-CT-649).
121. Lanni v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542, 544 (Ind. App. Ct. 2015) (quoting Plain-
tiff’s Appendix).
122. Id. at 545 (quoting Plaintiff’s Appendix).
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throughs of each competition site to “make sure the facility was set
up the way . . . that [the NCAA had] instructed the host [member
institution] to set it up.”123  In fact, Breece testified that his specific
event responsibilities “included site inspections to ensure compli-
ance by the member institution with NCAA mandates,” including
“verifying the placement of the pipe-and-drape barrier.”124
Despite all of this, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed a
summary judgment ruling for the NCAA, finding that “the NCAA’s
conduct does not demonstrate that it undertook or assumed a duty
to actually oversee or directly supervise the actions of the member
institutions and the NCAA’s student-athletes.”125  In making this de-
cision, the court compared Lanni’s case to two suits brought in the
Indiana courts against national fraternities, finding that “the spe-
cific duties undertaken by the NCAA with respect to the safety of its
student-athletes was simply to provide information and guidance to
the NCAA’s member institutions and student-athletes.”126
According to the court, while the NCAA’s actions to “actively
engage its member institutions and student-athletes in how to avoid
unsafe practices” are “commendable,” they “do not rise to the level
of assuring protection of the student-athletes from injuries that may
occur at sporting events.”127  Further, the court found “actual over-
sight and control cannot be imputed merely from the fact that the
NCAA has promulgated rules and regulations and required compli-
ance with those rules and regulations.”128
C. Mayall v. USA Water Polo129
In another lawsuit involving concussions in amateur sports,
plaintiff Alice Mayall filed a series of claims against USA Water Polo
after her sixteen-year-old daughter suffered a concussion “while
playing water polo for a team governed by [USA Water Polo’s] rules
123. Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s Appendix).
124. Id. at 553 (citing Plaintiff’s Appendix).
125. Id. (citing Smith v. Delta Tau Delta, Inc., 9 N.E.3d 154, 163 (Ind. 2014)).
126. Lanni, 42 N.E.3d at 553 (Ind. App. Ct. 2015) (citing Yost v. Wabash Col-
lege, 3 N.E.3d 509, 521 (Ind. 2014); Smith, 9 N.E.3d at 163). See infra notes
212–213 and accompanying text.
127. Lanni, 42 N.E.3d at 553.
128. Id.
129. This section discusses two separate opinions issued by the United States
District Court, Central District of California in the Mayall case: Mayall v. USA
Water Polo, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 3d 1220 (C.D. Cal. 2016) [hereinafter “Mayall I”]
and Mayall v. USA Water Polo, Inc., No. 8:15-cv-00171-AG-KES, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 115047 (C.D. Cal. 2016) [hereinafter “Mayall II”]. Mayall I was a decision
based on a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, while Mayall II was
based on a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.
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and policies.”130  After the plaintiff’s daughter was hit in the face
with a ball, neither the referee nor the coach stopped the game and
the coach—who was neither trained nor educated in concussion
management—allowed her to keep playing both in that game and
in subsequent matches in the USA Water Polo-sanctioned tourna-
ment.131  Following the tournament, the plaintiff’s daughter “suf-
fered physical symptoms, including headaches, excessive sleepiness,
and dizziness” and “continues to experience physical symptoms and
to struggle socially and academically.”132
In her First Amended Complaint, the plaintiff sought both
compensatory and injunctive relief, asking the court to require USA
Water Polo to change its policies and implement new rules and pro-
cedures to better manage concussions in the future.133  The request
for injunctive relief was denied, as the plaintiff’s daughter was no
longer playing water polo and thus was no longer subject to USA
Water Polo’s rules and policies.134
Additionally, the court was not convinced by the plaintiff’s ar-
gument that USA Water Polo “ha[d] a duty ‘to take reasonable
steps to recognize, manage, and appropriately treat head injuries
and concussions’ and ‘to provide players with rules, information,
and best practices that protect them as much as possible from short-
term and long-term health risks.’”135  Like Mehr, the court here
cited California’s controlling sports negligence case, Knight v. Jewett,
and found that concussions resulting from getting hit in the head
with a ball was an inherent risk of water polo, and thus no duty was
owed to the plaintiff’s daughter by USA Water Polo since the de-
fendants did nothing to increase the risks of concussions.136
Further analyzing the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant owed
a duty based on the voluntary undertaking doctrine, the court ruled
that the plaintiff had not “adequately alleged facts showing that De-
fendant undertook a specific duty to prevent or manage players’
head injuries.”137  The court found that USA Water Polo, in this
case had, at most, “voluntarily tried to minimize the inherent risks
130. Mayall I, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 1224.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. See id. (“Plaintiff sues on behalf of her sixteen-year old daughter, H.C.,
and others similarly situated, seeking compensatory and injunctive relief.”).
134. Id. at 1225.
135. Id. at 1227 (quoting plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint).
136. See id. at 1227–28 (citing Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992)).
137. Id. at 1229.
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of injury in water polo.”138  However, under California law, “volun-
tary efforts at minimizing risk do not demonstrate defendant bore a
legal duty to do so,” and thus the court dismissed the voluntary un-
dertaking claim.139
In her Second Amended Complaint, the plaintiff dropped her
request for injunctive relief and narrowed her focus on the negli-
gence claim, focusing instead on “the risk of secondary injuries that
can occur if a player returns to the game prematurely following a
concussion.”140  However, the court found the plaintiff’s attempts at
distinguishing secondary concussions from primary concussions in
this “untenable,” as “Plaintiff shows that secondary injuries are also
a prevalent, related occurrence.”141  Further, the court noted that
even if there was a distinction between primary and secondary head
injuries, “the distinction wouldn’t make a difference here because
the Court is not persuaded that the risk of secondary concussions is
not inherent to the sport.”142
Comparably, the court found the plaintiff’s added attempts to
apply the voluntary undertaking doctrine unpersuasive, stating that
the plaintiff “continue[d] to base Defendant’s purported voluntary
undertaking on a broad notion of health and safety.”143  The court
ruled that notions that the defendants “undertook both gratui-
tously and as a result of the payment of fees” the duty to “creat[e] a
healthy and safe environment” for participants too broad, and that
“internal and external communications concerning the general ex-
istence of a return-to-play policy” do not establish a specific under-
taking.144  Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff had not
pled facts sufficient to show that her daughter had “detrimentally
relied on any action taken by” USA Water Polo, causing her claim
to fail on both prongs required under California’s voluntary under-
taking doctrine: an increase of harm or detrimental reliance.145
Based on this analysis, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint.146
138. Id. at 1230.
139. Id. (citing Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 2012)).
140. Mayall II, No. 8:15-cv-00171-AG-KES, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115047, at *6
(C.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint).
141. Id.
142. Id. at *7.
143. Id. at *11.
144. Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint).
145. Id. at *12 (citing Paz v. State, 994 P.2d 975, 980 (Cal. 2000)).
146. Id. at *15.  This time, the court did not grant leave to amend, finding
that a third amended complaint “would be futile.” Id. at *14–*15.  The plaintiff
has appealed this case to the Ninth Circuit, with the final reply brief due on Sep-
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D. Hill v. Slippery Rock University
On September 9, 2011, Slippery Rock University (“SRU”) bas-
ketball player, Jack Hill, Jr., was playing “in a late-night, high-inten-
sity basketball practice” when he collapsed to the floor, suffering
from respiratory and cardiac arrest.147  Soon after being trans-
ported to the hospital, the young student-athlete passed away from
his ailments.148  An autopsy found that Hill had marked red blood
cell sickling in his lungs and liver consistent with Sickle Cell Trait
(SCT).149  Hill had not been tested for SCT by his college, and the
NCAA at the time did not require Division II schools like SRU to
test their student-athletes for SCT.150
Hill’s parents as executors of his estate sued SRU and the
NCAA for negligence, alleging that the two entities were negligent
“for not testing for or requiring testing on [Hill] for SCT prior to
allowing [him] to participate in athletic activities,” as well as for not
providing prompt medical care or for failing to adequately train or
supervise the staff on emergency first aid procedures.151  Addition-
ally, the plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA was negligent “for failing
to require Division II schools, such as [SRU], to screen its athletes
for SCT prior to their participation in athletic activities.”152
As evidence of the NCAA’s alleged breach of duty, the Hills
cited the fact that while the NCAA required SCT testing for Division
I athletes beginning in 2010, they did not require such testing for
Division II athletes until 2012, and their son had passed away dur-
ing that gap in enforcement.153  According to the Hills, “[i]f a
school failed to abide by the NCAA mandates for student[-]athlete
safety, that school would face sanctions;” thus, if the NCAA had in-
stituted SCT testing across all three levels at the same time, the
young Hill’s condition would have been caught in time to avoid his
death.154
tember 25, 2017.  Order Granting Motion to Extend Time to File Brief, Mayall v.
USA Water Polo, Inc., No. 16-56389 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 31).
147. Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., 138 A.3d 673, 675 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016)
(quoting Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., No. 14-10570, 2014 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 2,
at *2 (Ct. Com. Pl. Butler Cty. Dec. 22, 2014)).
148. See id. (citing Hill, No. 14-10570, 2014 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS, at *2).
149. See id. (citing Hill, No. 14-10570, 2014 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS, at *2).
150. See id. (citing Hill, No. 14-10570, 2014 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS, at *2–*3).
151. Id. (quoting Hill, No. 14-10570, 2014 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS, at *2).
152. Id. (quoting Hill, No. 14-10570, 2014 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS, at *3).
153. See id. at 678.
154. Id.
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The case was dismissed by the Court of Common Pleas of But-
ler County, which found that while the Hills had shown that the
NCAA had assumed a duty over their son, they had “failed to suffi-
ciently plead liability on the part of the NCAA” and thus concluded
that “no recovery was possible.”155  According to the trial court, the
plaintiffs did not “allege any specific representation made by the
NCAA which induced [the plaintiff’s son’s] reliance on the NCAA
to provide necessary medical conditions or sports participation pro-
tocols, or which induced [the plaintiff’s son] to forgo alternative
means of protecting himself.”156  As such, the trial court found that
the plaintiffs “failed to plead that the NCAA’s actions put [the
plaintiff’s son] in a worse situation than if the NCAA had never
undertaken to research and establish medical condition testing and
sports participation protocols,” and thus it could not be established
that the NCAA had breached any duty of care to the Hills’ son.157
The plaintiffs appealed this ruling to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, arguing that the trial court “erred in concluding that
an increased risk of harm, as required by section 323A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, can be based only on an affirmative
act.”158  The Superior Court noted that in their rationale dismissing
the case, the trial court had specifically cited Wissel and the Ohio
Court of Appeals’ analysis regarding the necessity of finding an in-
creased risk of harm to impose liability under section 323, and had
found that unlike in Wissel, the plaintiffs in the present case had
pled “sins of omission, rather than commission.”159
However, the Superior Court ruled that Wissel was not binding
authority on the courts in Pennsylvania, and, more importantly,
even if Wissel was binding authority, the trial court applied Wissel
incorrectly.160  The Superior Court reasoned that in Pennsylvania,
“an increased risk of harm can occur through a failure to act, or a
‘sin of omission.’”161
Citing the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the Superior Court
found that so long as the plaintiff can demonstrate “that defen-
155. Id. at 676 (interpreting the trial court’s holding in Hill, No. 14-10570,
2014 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS, at *37–*38).
156. Hill, No. 14-10570, 2014 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS, at *35.
157. Id. at *36.
158. Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., 138 A.3d 673, 675 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016). See
supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
159. Id. at 678–79 (quoting Hill, No. 14-10570, 2014 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS,
at *34).
160. See id. at 679.
161. Id. at 680.
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dant’s acts or omissions, in a situation to which section 323(a) ap-
plies, have increased the risk of harm to another,” it is enough to
find a basis for the court to move forward and allow a jury to deter-
mine whether or not the acts or omissions were the proximate
cause and cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries.162  Further, the Su-
perior Court noted Wissel’s interpretation of section 324A to find a
link between schools and overseeing organizations, and found that
similarly to Wissel, the Hills had “alleged the NCAA owed a duty of
care to Mr. Hill because he was a student at Slippery Rock
University.”163
Here, the Superior Court found that the Hills had sufficiently
pled that the NCAA had assumed a duty to their son and that the
NCAA, by not testing for SCT at Division II schools like SRU, could
reasonably be found by a jury to have breached that duty by increas-
ing the risk of harm.164  As a result, the Superior Court overruled
the trial court’s order removing the NCAA from the case and al-
lowed the Hills’ case against the NCAA to move forward.165
E. McCants v. NCAA
In late 2012, former North Carolina governor, James G. Mar-
tin, released a report (the “Martin Report”) detailing “‘serious
anomalies’ related to the course offers and methods of instruction”
within the Department of African and Afro-American Studies
(“AFAM”) at the University of North Carolina (UNC).166  Accord-
ing to these allegations, UNC “enrolled a number of students in
independent studies classes . . . which involved no instruction, no
faculty supervision, and required no class attendance.”167
162. Id. (citing Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978)).
163. Id. at 679 (citing Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint).
164. See id. at 680.
165. See id.  An appeal by the NCAA to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
denied on January 4, 2017.  Appeal Docket Sheet at 7, Hill v. Slippery Rock Univer-
sity, 138 A.3d 673 (No. 180 WDA 2015) (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017), available at https://
ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/AppellateCourtReport.ashx?docketNumber=
180+WDA+2015 [https://perma.cc/B7SL-A7YD].  The case is currently pending
remanded action at the trial court level. See Zack Needles, Justices Clear Path for Suit
Against NCAA Over Student Death, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 6, 2017), http://
www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202776260180/Justices-Clear-Path-for-Suit-
Against-NCAA-Over-Student-Death?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL [https:/
/perma.cc/FN8R-Z5GP].
166. James G. Martin, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Academic
Anomalies Review Report of Findings, UNIV. N.C. CHAPEL HILL ii (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://carolinacommitment.unc.edu/files/2013/01/UNC-Governor-Martin-Final-
Report-and-Addendum-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GED-76QY].
167. McCants v. NCAA, 201 F. Supp. 3d 732, 736 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (quoting
Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
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Two of these students, former UNC basketball player,
Rashanda McCants, and football player, Devon Ramsay, filed a class
action lawsuit in 2015 against the NCAA for negligence and breach
of fiduciary duty for failing in their alleged duty to “protect the edu-
cation and educational opportunities of student-athletes (including
the provision of academically sound courses) participating in
NCAA-sponsored athletic programs at NCAA member institu-
tions.”168  These former UNC student-athletes alleged that because
“[t]he NCAA . . . has made a firm promise and commitment to
college athletes—that it will protect the education and educational
opportunities of men and women participating in college athlet-
ics”—and it “has held itself out as the principle guardian of college
athletes’ academic welfare,” the NCAA’s failure to prevent UNC’s
academic fraud was a breach of its duty to the purported class of
former UNC students.169
The court in this case was skeptical from the start of the plain-
tiffs’ allegations, noting that the “Plaintiffs’ Complaint spans 100
pages and contains 259 paragraphs” which contain “broad, sweep-
ing assertions that are neither specific to the NCAA nor specific to
the plaintiffs in this case” and, in the court’s view, were “perhaps
intended for public consumption” rather than as a legal com-
plaint.170  While attempting to narrow down the plaintiffs’ argu-
ments to legal issues specific to the claims alleged, the court stated
that it had asked the plaintiffs’ counsel at oral arguments “to state
the specific facts that they contend demonstrate a voluntary under-
taking by the NCAA.”171  However, the court noted that the plain-
tiffs’ counsel “failed to address the Court’s inquiry,” instead relying
on “generalized, sweeping assertions” which are “not sufficient as a
matter of law to show that the NCAA undertook any specific, affirm-
ative tasks that would amount to a voluntary undertaking recog-
nized by North Carolina law.”172
The court inferred that based on “[a] careful reading of the
Complaint,” the plaintiffs’ allegations of the NCAA’s voluntary un-
dertaking came from alleged “promises” the NCAA has made to
“protect the education and educational opportunities of men and
women participating in college athletics” through NCAA governing
documents, public speeches by NCAA officials, and documents on
168. Id. at 738 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
169. Id. at 740 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 740.
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the NCAA website.173  The court also inferred the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment that the NCAA had voluntarily undertaken a duty of care in
this area through the passage of “various rules and procedures
promulgated by the NCAA that concern academics, including its
eligibility requirements for student-athletes.”174
Addressing these areas one-by-one, the court first analyzed
whether the NCAA’s public statements, Constitution, Bylaws, and
websites constituted the voluntary undertaking necessary to assume
a held duty of care to its student-athletes.175  Here, the court noted
that the plaintiffs had “provided no North Carolina court decisions
that would support their claim that public statements espousing as-
pirational goals, statements of generic intent, or statements vowing
or acknowledging that it has a duty . . . constitute promises that
would create a legal duty based on a voluntary undertaking.”176
The court reasoned that the NCAA’s public statements, Constitu-
tion, Bylaws, and websites were mere “promises that it has now ‘bro-
ken,’” which “cannot form the basis of their claim of negligence
based on a voluntary undertaking.”177
For the NCAA’s purported duty based on their rules, policies,
and procedures, the court found that even though “rules and regu-
lations promulgated by the NCAA may be relevant to the issue of
breach of the standard of care,” such evidence is “irrelevant to the
threshold issue of whether a legal duty exists in the first in-
stance.”178  The court based its reasoning on the fact that the plain-
tiffs never alleged that the NCAA actually engaged in the “specific
tasks”  to “institute, supervise, monitor, and provide adequate mech-
anisms to ensure the ‘academic soundness’ of classes” at UNC.179
Indeed, the court found that the plaintiffs’ Complaint in fact
alleged the opposite: that “NCAA member schools ultimately pro-
vide the education” and that “the NCAA does not and has never
conducted any regular review of college courses taken or majors
selected by or for student athletes, or required its member schools
to submit course catalogues, lists and descriptions of courses taken
by student-athletes, or descriptions of those courses.”180  As such,
173. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
174. Id. at 741 (citing Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 742.
178. Id. at 745.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 746 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
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the court found these actions insufficient as a voluntary undertak-
ing required to impose a duty of care.
While the court noted the plaintiffs’ argument that “a volun-
tary undertaking can ‘arise . . . from a gratuitous promise, unen-
forceable in contract’” based on sections 323 and 324A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court did not find this argu-
ment persuasive in this context.181  Mentioning that the North Car-
olina Supreme Court “has emphasized that the Second
Restatement of Torts is not the law of North Carolina, though it
may be persuasive in certain contexts,” the court found that court
decisions in North Carolina have repeatedly held that “any under-
taking, irrespective of its source, requires affirmative conduct by the
alleged tortfeasor.”182
Based on this reasoning, the court found that the plaintiffs had
“failed as a matter of law to allege a plausible claim of negligence
based on the voluntary undertaking theory under North Carolina
law” and thus dismissed their negligence claim.183
F. Schmitz v. NCAA
Adding to a trend of lawsuits filed against the NCAA regarding
concussions and head injuries, former University of Notre Dame
football player, Steven Schmitz, sued the NCAA in October 2014 for
negligence and fraudulent concealment claims.184  Schmitz had
played running back and receiver at Notre Dame from 1974–78 and
was diagnosed with chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) in
December 2012.185  By that time, “Schmitz was 57 years old and un-
employable, suffering from severe memory loss, cognitive decline,
early onset Alzheimer’s disease, traumatic encephalopathy, and
dementia.”186
181. Id. at 742 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Complaint).
182. Id. at 742–43 (emphasis in original) (citing Cassell v. Collins, 472 S.E.2d
770, 772 (N.C. 1996)) (“We reemphasize yet again that the Restatement of Torts is
not North Carolina Law.”).
183. Id. at 746.  The breach of fiduciary duty claim was dismissed as well. Id.
at 749.
184. See Schmitz v. NCAA, 67 N.E.3d 852, 857 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
Schmitz’s estate and wife (acting both as an individual and as fiduciary for
Schmitz’s estate) took over as plaintiffs after Schmitz passed away in February 2015.
Id.  See NCAA Facing 43 Concussion Lawsuits After Latest Filings, ESPN (Oct. 5, 2016),
http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/17722844/ncaa-facing-43-con
cussion-lawsuits-latest-filings [https://perma.cc/3Y3B-PFMY].
185. See Schmitz, 67 N.E.3d at 856–57 (citing Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint).
186. Id. at 857 (citing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint).
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After overruling the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint on
statute of limitations grounds, the Ohio Court of Appeals discussed
Schmitz’s claim that the NCAA and Notre Dame had “failed to no-
tify, educate, and protect the plaintiff Steve Schmitz (and others)
regarding the debilitating long term dangers of concussions, con-
cussion-related impacts, and sub-concussive impacts that result
every day from amateur athletic competition in the form of football
at the collegiate level.”187  In regards to the NCAA, Schmitz argued
that the Association’s failure to promulgate rules to protect student-
athletes from concussions despite knowing of “the risks of concus-
sive and subconcussive impacts” constituted a breach of a duty of
care owed to Schmitz and other student-athletes under their
jurisdiction.188
In response, the NCAA relied heavily on the recently decided
Lanni case, arguing that like in Lanni, there were “no set of facts to
show that the NCAA took affirmative and deliberate steps to assume
a duty recognized by law specifically to prevent the injuries” alleged
by Schmitz and that like in Lanni, “[t]he NCAA’s conduct does not
demonstrate that it undertook or assumed a duty to actually oversee
or directly supervise the actions of the member institutions and the
NCAA’s student-athletes.”189
However, the Ohio Court of Appeals felt differently, finding
that even if Lanni was a controlling decision in Ohio, the facts of
the present case make Lanni materially distinguishable.190  The
court found “a number of factual distinctions between the two
cases,” including the facts surrounding the foreseeability of harm
and the public policy foundations of the two cases, along with the
simple fact that the Lanni court was deciding a motion for summary
judgment instead of a motion to dismiss.191
Unlike in Lanni, the court, interpreting the plaintiff’s com-
plaint, saw a scenario where the NCAA “voluntarily oversees and
187. Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint).
188. Id. at 867 (citing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint).
189. Brief of Appellee National Collegiate Athletic Association at 27, Schmitz
v. NCAA, 2016-Ohio-8041 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (No. CA-15-103525) (citing Lanni
v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)).  For a further discussion of Lanni, see
supra notes 110–128.
190. See Schmitz, 67 N.E.3d at 867.  Schmitz and the NCAA had disagreed
about the controlling law in this case, with the NCAA arguing that Indiana law
should apply, while Schmitz felt that the conflict was governed instead by Ohio law.
See id. at 865.  The court found that since the elements of Schmitz’s claims were
“substantially similar under Indiana and Ohio law” (as the NCAA conceded), a
choice of law determination was unnecessary and thus applied Ohio law. Id.
191. Id. at 867.
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promulgates the rules and regulations for college football for the
purpose of providing a competitive environment that is safe and
ensures fair play,” “knew of the risks of concussive and subconcus-
sive impacts yet failed to warn or disclose such risks to Schmitz,”
and yet “failed to promulgate rules to protect against such risks . . .
plac[ing] economic interests over Schmitz’s safety.”192  While the
court was careful to state that they were not deciding whether the
plaintiff could actually prove the allegations pled in the complaint,
it found that based on the facts pled in the complaint, a duty of
care may exist, and thus it could not say “that there is no set of facts
consistent with plaintiffs’ complaint that would impose a legally rec-
ognized duty upon the NCAA.”193
Finding that the plaintiff had pled sufficient facts to show that
the NCAA had a duty of care—at least under “Ohio’s liberal plead-
ing standard”—the court found that the trial court erred in dis-
missing the plaintiffs’ negligence claim and allowed the negligence
claim to continue at least through discovery.194
IV. APPLYING A DUTY OF CARE TO OVERSEEING ATHLETIC
ORGANIZATIONS
A. Common Themes
These six cases present common themes that may represent a
burgeoning legal issue moving forward for these overseeing athletic
organizations.  Each claim discusses the possibility that overseeing
athletic organizations can be liable for their actions under the vol-
untary undertaking doctrine.  Together, these decisions create a
spectrum of precedent that gives a guideline of how courts may de-
cide similar cases in the future.
In each of these cases, the plaintiff argued that the organiza-
tion in question owed a duty of care based on its voluntary actions
of creating rules and policies for player safety (or, for McCants, for
the players’ promised academic integrity).
192. Id. (citing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint).
193. Id. at 868.
194. Id.  The appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court for
further proceedings. Id. at 871.  The NCAA appealed the appellate court’s deci-
sion to the Ohio Supreme Court on January 20, 2017.  Case Information, THE SU-
PREME COURT OF OHIO, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Clerk/ecms/#/
caseinfo/2017/0098 [https://perma.cc/L2PZ-FVGB].  However, the basis for the
NCAA’s appeal does not touch the negligence claims; its argument in support of
Ohio Supreme Court jurisdiction is solely based on statute of limitations concerns.
See Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Appellants NCAA and Univ. of No-
tre Dame du Lac, No. 2017-0098 (Ohio Jan. 20, 2017).
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The plaintiff in Lanni argued that by adopting the safety rules
of the USFA specific to her injury, the NCAA through its Fencing
Committee assumed a responsibility to ensure that those rules were
being followed.195  The Mehr plaintiffs alleged that by taking a posi-
tion as “a regulatory body for soccer and soccer players,” the various
defendants failed in their duty to protect youth soccer players by
not conforming to the best practice guidelines adopted by the In-
ternational Conferences on Concussions in Sport.196  Similarly, the
plaintiff in Mayall argued that USA Water Polo had taken on a duty
“to take reasonable steps to recognize, manage, and appropriately
treat head injuries and concussions” by taking entry fees and by un-
dertaking a general duty to “creat[e] a healthy and safe
environment.”197
The Hill plaintiffs argued that by creating a health and safety
policy for Division I athletes, the NCAA assumed a duty to all of its
student-athletes to enforce the same policy.198  The McCants plain-
tiffs alleged that the NCAA had voluntarily undertaken a duty to
protect student-athlete academics through its rules, governing doc-
uments, public speeches by NCAA officials, and documents on the
NCAA website concerning its commitment to protect student-ath-
lete academic integrity.199  Finally, Steven Schmitz argued that the
NCAA had assumed a duty by “voluntarily oversee[ing] and promul-
gat[ing] the rules and regulations for college football for the pur-
pose of providing a competitive environment that is safe and
ensures fair play” and failed in this duty by “fail[ing] to promulgate
rules to protect against such risks.”200
In each case, the courts had to decide whether such conduct
did, in fact, create an enforceable duty of care, or whether a broad
duty to player safety simply amounted to “aspirational statements”
that “do not rise to the level of an assumption of a legal duty.”201
195. See Lanni v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542, 544 (Ind. App. Ct. 2015). See supra
notes 121–123 and accompanying text.
196. Complaint at 425–26, Mehr v. Fe´deration Intern. de Football Ass’n, 115
F. Supp. 3d 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 14-cv-3879-PJH). See Mehr v. US Soccer, et
al., 115 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1065–69 (N.D. Cal. 2015). See supra notes 96–107 and
accompanying text.
197. Mayall I, 174 F. Supp. 3d 1220, 1227 (C.D. Cal. 2016); Mayall II, No. 8:15-
cv-00171-AG-KES, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115047, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
198. See Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., 138 A.3d 673, 675 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
See supra notes 153–154 and accompanying text.
199. See McCants v. NCAA, 201 F. Supp. 3d 732, 740–41 (M.D.N.C. 2016). See
supra notes 173–174 and accompanying text.
200. Schmitz v. NCAA, 67 N.E.3d 852, 867 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
201. Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., No. 14-10570, 2014 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 2,
at *30 (Ct. Com. Pl. Butler Cty. Dec. 22, 2014). See also McCants, 201 F. Supp. 3d at
33
Ehrlich: Gratuitous Promises: Overseeing Athletic Organizations and the Du
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
34 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25: p. 1
And while the facts of each case differed, the court reached its dif-
fering conclusions based on parallel criteria.
At one end of the spectrum, the decisions in Mehr and Mayall
establish that under the traditional voluntary undertaking doctrine
found in section 323, organizations that merely take a “broad re-
sponsibility” to promote safety in their sport cannot be held as hav-
ing “specifically undertaken a duty” to keep players safe.202  The
organization must undertake a “specific task” towards reducing the
risk of the injury in question; showing the defendant undertook a
duty based on a “broad notion of health and safety” is not
enough.203  Further, Mehr and Mayall both establish that when the
injury results from an “inherent risk of the game,” proving the exis-
tence of a breached duty of care becomes even harder.204
At the other end of the spectrum, the Hill decision shows that
courts will entertain claims where a plaintiff can show that a health
and safety policy that is in place but is inconsistently applied may, in
fact, be sufficient to find a voluntarily undertaken duty of care.205
The court in Hill found that since an increased risk of harm could
741 (finding that “public statements espousing aspirational goals, statements of
generic intent, or statements vowing or acknowledging that it has a duty” do not
“constitute promises that would create a legal duty based on a voluntary undertak-
ing”); Mehr v. Fe´deration Intern. de Football Ass’n, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1066
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (“US Soccer . . . argues that broad statements and generalizations
about US Soccer’s role in the sport and references to its enforcement of the Laws
of the Game are not enough to establish a voluntary undertaking.”); Mayall I, 174
F. Supp. 3d at 1229 (“Plaintiff bases Defendant’s purported voluntary undertaking
on vague, sweeping allegations . . . Those actions and statements don’t support
that Defendant undertook any specific task to prevent or care for head injuries.”).
But see Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 605 N.E.2d 458, 465 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992) (“The fact that these organizations purport to act gratuitously and for noble
purposes does not, ipso facto, absolve them of a legal duty of care toward the
athletes.”).
202. Mehr, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1066. See also Mayall II, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115047 at *11–*13 (finding that liability under the voluntary undertaking doctrine
must come from the organization either increasing the risk of harm causing detri-
mental reliance on the organization’s actions).
203. Mayall II, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115047, at *11. See also Mehr, 115 F.
Supp. 3d at 1066–69 (finding that plaintiffs had identified no facts that support a
claim that any of the four defendants had specifically undertaken to adopt the best
practice guidelines or to take any specific action to eliminate risks of concussions).
204. Mayall II, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115047, at *11 (“At most, Defendant’s
efforts show that Defendant voluntarily tried to minimize the inherent risks of sec-
ondary injuries in water polo.”) (emphasis in original); Mehr, 115 F. Supp. 3d at
1066–69 (“Plaintiffs have alleged no basis for imputing to any defendant a legal
duty to reduce the risks inherent in the sport of soccer.”). See also Paz v. State, 994
P.2d 975, 981 (Cal. 2000) (“[A] failure to alleviate a risk cannot be regarded as
tantamount to increasing that risk.”).
205. See Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., 138 A.3d 673, 679 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016)
(“Had the NCAA’s protocols tested for SCT at Division II schools, Mr. Hill may not
have suffered the event that caused his death.  Thus, Appellants claimed that the
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be found through this “sin of omission,” it should be up to the jury
to find whether “such increased risk was in turn a substantial factor
in bringing about the resultant harm.”206
Lanni and Schmitz both fall towards the middle of this spec-
trum, as in both cases the NCAA was accused of failing in its respon-
sibility to either enforce rules it had already adopted, or to create
rules based on risks that they allegedly knew about but “placed its
economic interests” over student-athletes’ safety instead of creating
rules to guard against these risks.207  While the two cases had differ-
ent outcomes, Schmitz helpfully cites and distinguishes Lanni in
depth, allowing for a meaningful look at the differences between
the two cases.208
According to the Schmitz court, Lanni is distinguishable not
only due to the differences in law and the stage of the proceedings
but also due to “a number of factual distinctions between the two
cases.”209  Based on the complaint, the Schmitz court saw a scenario
where:
(1) the NCAA voluntarily oversees and promulgates the
rules and regulations for college football for the purpose
of providing a competitive environment that is safe and
ensures fair play, (2) that it knew of the risks of concussive
and subconcussive impacts yet failed to warn or disclose
such risks to Schmitz, (3) that it failed to promulgate rules
to protect against such risks, and (4) that it placed its eco-
nomic interests over Schmitz’s safety, who in turn devel-
inadequate pre-participation physical, which allowed Mr. Hill to play basketball,
increased his risk of harm.”).
206. Id. at 680 (citing Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978)).
207. Schmitz v. NCAA, 67 N.E.2d 852, 867 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). See Lanni v.
NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542, 545 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
208. See Schmitz, 67 N.E.2d at 867–68 (finding procedural differences between
cases as paramount distinction).
209. Id. at 867. Lanni was a motion for summary judgment, Schmitz was a
motion to dismiss.  The court found this distinction to be a vital difference. See id.
(“Although we believe that there are a number of factual distinctions between the
two cases . . . we find the most significant distinction is a procedural one: the Lanni
court was reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment—not a motion to
dismiss.”); see also supra note 191 and accompanying text.  It is conceivable that the
Schmitz court would have found differently if the decision was based on a motion
for summary judgment, but unfortunately this will remain unknown for some time
as Schmitz is currently under appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court for issues based
entirely on the statute of limitations discovery rule and not at all on the voluntary
undertaking doctrine.  Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Appellants Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association and University of Notre Dame du Lac,
Schmitz v. NCAA, No. 2017-0098 (Ohio Jan. 20, 2017); see also supra note 194 and
accompanying text.
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oped the latent brain disease of CTE. The complaint
further alleges that “Schmitz relied upon the guidance, ex-
pertise, and instruction” of the NCAA regarding “the seri-
ous and life-altering medical issue of concussive and sub-
concussive risk in football.”210
In essence, the Schmitz decision turned on the fact that the
plaintiff was able to allege in the complaint that the NCAA had
complete oversight of health and safety rules and yet failed to do
anything about it.211
By contrast, Lanni hinged on the issue of direct oversight; that
is, whether the NCAA’s specific undertaking extended to “actual
oversight and control” over student-athletes.212  The Lanni court com-
pared the NCAA’s actions to those of a national fraternity, relying
on two similar Indiana Supreme Court decisions about whether na-
tional fraternities owe a duty of care to their individual student
members to prevent injuries caused by hazing.213
The one outlier here is McCants, where the NCAA has estab-
lished itself as a guardian of student-athlete academic integrity, and
yet allegedly failed to protect the plaintiffs from UNC’s actions.214
210. See Schmitz, 67 N.E.2d at 867–68.
211. See id.  The court was careful to note its decision was based on “Ohio’s
liberal pleading standard” and emphasized its decision held that it “cannot say that
there is no set of facts consistent with plaintiffs’ complaint that would impose a
legally recognized duty upon the NCAA.” Id. at 868.
212. Lanni v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542, 551 (Ind. App. Ct. 2015) (citing Yost v.
Wabash Coll., 3 N.E.3d 509, 521 (Ind. 2014)).
213. See id. at 550–53 (citing Yost, 3 N.E.3d 509; Smith v. Delta Tau Delta, Inc.,
9 N.E.3d 154 (Ind. 2014)).
214. At the time the McCants Complaint was filed, however, the NCAA did not
have clear rules against the type of academic misconduct that UNC has been ac-
cused of, forcing the plaintiffs to rely on “broad, sweeping assertions” obtained
from the NCAA Bylaws and NCAA officer statements.  McCants v. NCAA, 201 F.
Supp. 3d 732, 740–41 (M.D.N.C 2016). See Complaint at 9, McCants v. NCAA, 201
F. Supp. 3d 732 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-176) (“Moreover, the
NCAA’s Operating Bylaw 19 prohibits ‘academic fraud’ by DI athletes or their
schools and identifies that conduct as a breach of NCAA rules subject to the most
severe penalties.”); DIVISION I MANUAL–APRIL 2011–12, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATH-
LETIC ASS’N, art. 19.5.2 (2012), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/D1_2012_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY72-3RFK].  Since Mc-
Cants was filed, however, the NCAA has instituted new bylaws (adopted on Apr. 28,
2016 and effective Aug. 1, 2016) that are seemingly specifically designed to combat
the type of academic misconduct that the McCants plaintiffs alleged. See DIVISION I
MANUAL – AUGUST 2016–17, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, art. 14.9.2.2
(2016), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/
D117.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7TY-WHGE] (“A current or former institutional
staff member or a representative of an institution’s athletics interests shall not be
involved (with or without the knowledge of the student-athlete) in: (a) Academic
misconduct related to a student-athlete; or (b) The alteration or falsification of a
student-athlete’s transcript or academic record.”); see also ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT,
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However, this case’s position outside of the established spectrum
can be established for two reasons.  First, North Carolina law is in
the minority of jurisdictions that does not recognize section 324A as
binding precedent, and thus they did not analyze whether a con-
nection of oversight existed between UNC and the NCAA.215  Ad-
ding to this, the state’s version of the voluntary undertaking
doctrine requires that any undertaking requires “affirmative con-
duct by the alleged tortfeasor,” contrary to the NCAA’s passive crea-
tion of rules and statements.216
Second, McCants is outside the spectrum because North Caro-
lina courts “finding negligent performance of a duty assumed have
done so only in cases involving physical injury or property dam-
age.”217  By contrast to the other cases, where the injuries involved
were physical in nature, the McCants plaintiffs suffered only eco-
nomic damages.218  As such, and as the court noted, “even if, for
the sake of argument, the Court found that Plaintiffs’ Complaint
sufficiently alleged a voluntary undertaking, their negligence claim
would still fail.”219
But for most overseeing athlete organizations like the NCAA,
national governing bodies, and private high school athletic associa-
tions, these six cases share common facts and legal theories, thus
defining a spectrum whereby these associations may or may not
have a held duty of care to their athletes.
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (April 2016), available at https://
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DIENF_AcademicIntegrityAt-a-
GlanceGraphic_20160721.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW7C-VPCK].  It would be in-
teresting to see a new case adjudicated based on a similar scandal that occurs after
this bylaw’s adoption, as a more lenient jurisdiction could conceivably see these
new rules as a voluntary undertaking by the NCAA to prevent the very harm that
the McCants plaintiffs claimed to have suffered.
215. See McCants, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 742 (“[T]he North Carolina Supreme
Court has emphasized that the Second Restatement of Torts is not the law of
North Carolina, though it may be persuasive in certain contexts.”). See also Cassell
v. Collins, 472 S.E.2d 770, 772 (N.C. 1996) (“We reemphasize yet again that the
Restatement of Torts is not North Carolina law.”); Dawkins ex rel. Estate of Dawkins
v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 2d 750, 755–56 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (refusing to recog-
nize a duty under § 324A of Second Restatement of Torts, explaining that “[i]t is
unlikely that the North Carolina Supreme Court would impose on a defendant any
tort duty based on the Second Restatement of Torts”).
216. McCants, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 743.
217. Id. at 743–44 (citing McFadyen v. Duke Univ., 786 F. Supp. 2d 887, 998
(M.D.N.C. 2011)) (holding that North Carolina would not recognize a claim of
negligence based on the voluntary undertaking doctrine where the injury is eco-
nomic in nature).
218. See id.
219. Id. at 743.
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B. Section 324A: The Companion Provision
While all six recent cases discussed overseeing athletic organi-
zation liability based on the traditional voluntary undertaking doc-
trine (section 323), only two of these cases went as far as Wissel and
discussed the organizations’ potential liability based on the doc-
trine’s companion provision: section 324A.  The plaintiffs in all six
recent cases discussed above could have arguably made use of sec-
tion 324A(b) to attach a duty of care to the defendant overseeing
athletic association, yet just one of these cases—Hill v. Slippery Rock
University—was successful without making this argument.220
Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, also
known as the “Good Samaritan Doctrine,” provides that those who
“render services to another which he should recognize as necessary
for the protection of a third person or his things” may be liable to
that third person for a “failure to exercise reasonable care to pro-
tect his undertaking.”221  If that person’s failure to exercise reasona-
ble care increases the risk of harm, he undertakes “to perform a
duty owed by the other to the third person,” or harm is suffered by
the other or third person in reliance of the undertaking.222
Section 324A has been said to extend “identical liability” as sec-
tion 323 to third persons, essentially holding the third party to the
same duty of care as the overseeing party in a normal voluntary
undertaking case.223  Subsection (b) goes further and finds that en-
tities who take over a duty owed by another to that third person can
be liable to that third person for a failure to exercise reasonable
care.224  Put in context, the Wissel court found that since a high
school student-athlete was owed a duty of care by his school, and
the school “allowed the conduct of its football games to be largely
governed by the policies and decisions” of the OHSAA, the OHSAA
had a duty of care through its policies and decisions to protect the
student-athlete.225
220. See Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., 138 A.3d 673, 679 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.  The only case where the plaintiffs did
invoke § 324A, McCants, did so in a jurisdiction that has not adopted the rule as
state law. See infra note 235.
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). See
supra note 49.
222. Id.
223. Tollenaar v. Chino Valley Sch. Dist., 945 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1997) (“Section 323 provides . . . Section 324A extends identical liability to third
persons.”).
224. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
225. Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 605 N.E.2d 458, 465–66 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992). See also supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
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It must be noted that the language of section 324A(b) has
been interpreted “to reach not the situation in which one under-
takes to perform functions coordinate to—or even duplicative of—
activities imposed on another by a legal duty, but rather the situa-
tion in which one actually undertakes to perform for the other the
legal duty itself.”226  Interpreting the language of subsection (b),
the United States District Court in Blessing v. United States227 found
that all of the examples given by the Restatement authors seem to
suggest that “the one held liable when he negligently performed his
undertaking and injury to a third person resulted had undertaken
to perform tasks on behalf of another and in lieu of that other.”228
This would likely not apply in cases with overseeing athletic organi-
zations who make rules and influence the actions of schools under
their charge but rarely undertake these duties directly.  However,
the broad application in Wissel suggests a much wider application in
the amateur sports context, especially in combination with the
sharp public policy concerns addressed by the Wissel court and
given that most of the rules promulgated by the overseeing athletic
organizations are punishable mandates rather than mere
recommendations.229
The courts of forty-four states have adopted or applied section
323, 324A, or both.230  Section 324A alone has been expressly
adopted by the high courts of thirty-six states.231  Two other states
226. Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1193–94 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
This case was cited in the Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ. trial court decision to dismiss
the plaintiff’s claim under § 324A(b).  Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., No. 14-10570,
2014 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 2, at *37–*38 (Ct. Com. Pl. Butler Cty. Dec. 22, 2014).
The appellate court did not address this argument in vacating the trial court deci-
sion. See generally Hill, 138 A.3d at 673.
227. 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
228. Id. at 1194–95 (emphasis added).  Indeed, the Fifth Circuit in Davis v.
Liberty Mut. Ins.—one of the cases cited in Blessing—declined to apply § 324A(b)
after finding that the employer “used [the defendant] for recommendations as an
aid to the company in fulfilling its own duty to provide a safe place to work” rather
than having the defendant assume the duty directly.  Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 525
F.2d 1204, 1207–08 (5th Cir. 1976).  This interpretation does appear to be on
point with the actions of the overseeing athletic organizations in many of the cases
discussed in this Article, though the fact that most of the safety rules in these con-
texts are punishable mandates rather than mere recommendations is likely a rea-
son why Wissel distinguished this interpretation.
229. Wissel, 605 N.E.2d at 465–66. See supra notes 1, 60, 74, 74, and 228 and
accompanying text.
230. See Brief for Respondent at 13, Bragg v. United States, 230 W. Va. 532
(Sept. 5, 2012) available at http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/calendar/
2012/briefs/oct12/12-0850respondent.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QRA-BBSY].
231. See, e.g., Paz v. State, 994 P.2d 975, 977 (Cal. 2000) (“[T]he section 324A
theory of liability . . . is a settled principle firmly rooted in the common law of
negligence.”); Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035, 1051 (Fla. 2009) (“[T]he under-
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have “adopt[ed] a common law cause of action containing lan-
guage similar to the language used in [section] 324A.”232
While the Ohio Supreme Court has not expressly adopted sec-
tion 324A, the Ohio Court of Appeals has affirmatively adopted the
provision.233  On the other hand, the Connecticut Supreme Court
taker’s doctrine is a well-developed, entrenched aspect of Florida tort law. . . .
section 324A supplies additional insight concerning the type of harm that the
tortfeasor’s alleged negligent undertaking must have caused for the courts to rec-
ognize a duty of care.”); Huggins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 264 S.E.2d 191, 192 (Ga.
1980) (“We here adopt the majority rule as stated in the Restatement 2d Torts
§ 324A.”); Espinal v. Melville Contrs., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 140 (N.Y. 2002) (referring to
three conditions of § 324A: “[t]hese principles are firmly rooted in our case law,
and have been generally recognized by other authorities”); Seay v. Travelers In-
demnity Co., 730 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tex. App. 1987); Kathryn Michele Glegg, Negli-
gent Inspection: Texas Expressly Adopts the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 324A in
Seay v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 41 Sw L.J. 1041 (1987); Nicole Rosenkrantz, The Par-
ent Trap: Using the Good Samaritan Doctrine to Hold Parent Corporations Directly Liable
for Their Negligence, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1996) (citing Heinrich v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 532 F. Supp. 1348, 1354 (D. Md. 1982), Ray v. Transamerica
Ins., 208 N.W.2d 610, 657 (Mich. 1973), and Wright v. Scluam, 781 P.2d 1142, 1144
(Nev. 1989) as examples of courts that have expressly adopted § 324A).
232. Rosenkrantz, supra note 231, at 1061–62 (citing Mullins v. Pine Manor
Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 336 n.10 (Mass. 1983)) (stating that Massachusetts’s version
of § 324A differs from Restatement).  Rhode Island is another state that has its own
common law version of § 324A. See Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245, 1259–60 (R.I.
2012).
[T]his Court has not adopted the more “relaxed” standards set forth in
§§ 323 and 324 of the restatement . . . and we decline to do so in the
context of this appeal. . . . Thus, we will not review plaintiff’s voluntary-
assumption-of-duty argument under the standard of § 324A as urged by
plaintiff, but instead we proceed to do so through the lens of our existing
case law.
Id.
233. See Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 605 N.E.2d 458, 466 n.3
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (“Although we have found no cases in which the Ohio Su-
preme Court has expressly adopted Section 324A, the court [has] . . . cited Section
324A.  Other Ohio appellate courts have either cited or employed Section 324A in
such manner as to assume, sub silentio, its place in Ohio law.”); see also Hill v. Soni-
trol of Sw. Ohio, Inc., 521 N.E.2d 780, 786 (Ohio 1988) (“Even if we were to adopt
Section 324A(c), the present case is clearly distinguishable.”).  As discussed above,
§ 323 has also not been expressly adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court. See supra
note 39.  The law in Indiana is similarly situated, as while the Indiana Supreme
Court has not yet definitively adopted § 324A, a number of Indiana Court of Ap-
peals cases have applied it favorably. See Light v. NIPSCO Indus., Inc., 747 N.E.2d
73, 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that two prior Indiana Court of Appeals cases
had “equated Indiana law with the provisions of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 324A (1977)”) (citing Baker v. Midland-Ross Corp., 508 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1987); Harper v. Guarantee Auto Stores, 533 N.E.2d 1258, 1262 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989)).  The Light court noted that while the Harper court had “added the
requirement that the evidence establish that the defendant should have recog-
nized the careful execution of its undertaking was necessary for the protection of
the injured party,” more recent decisions “simply have asserted that Indiana law
parallels § 324A.” Id.; see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Malander, 996 N.E.2d 412, 420–21
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013).  However, these interpretations have been limited in cases of
gratuitous promises rather than contractual obligations, as the Indiana Supreme
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has adopted section 324A only in limited factual circumstances, and
the Michigan Supreme Court has limited application of section
324A to cases where the adoption of a duty creates a “separate and
distinct” obligation apart from the duty adopted by contract.234
Only three states have definitively rejected section 324A.  As
discussed in McCants, North Carolina has refused to adopt section
324A at all.235  The South Carolina Supreme Court has also defini-
tively “decline[d] to adopt the expanded liability of [section] 324,”
as has the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.236
Similarly, other states have adopted section 324A as persuasive,
but not binding, authority.  The New Mexico Supreme Court has
stated that the Restatement—including section 324A—is “merely
persuasive authority” that is “entitled to great weight” but is not
binding.237  The Delaware Supreme Court has also not yet “ex-
pressly adopted [section] 324A,” but it has “referred to it in consid-
ering potential liability.”238  Section 324A has also been expressly
applied recently in an unpublished Delaware Superior Court opin-
Court has ruled that “judicially impos[ing] liability under a theory of gratuitously
assumed duty is unwise policy and should be cautiously invoked only in extreme
circumstances involving a negligently performed assumed undertaking.”  Yost v.
Wabash Coll., 3 N.E.3d 509, 518 (Ind. 2014). See infra note 251 and accompanying
text.
234. Fultz v. Union-Commerce Assoc., 683 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Mich. 2004)
(“We believe that the ‘separate and distinct’ definition of misfeasance offers better
guidance in determining whether a negligence action based on a contract and
brought by a third party to that contract may lie because it focuses on the thresh-
old question of duty in a negligence claim.”). See Gazo v. Stamford, 765 A.2d 505,
510 (Conn. 2001) (“We adopt § 324A(b), at least in the circumstances of the pre-
sent case, in which it is clear that the service was performed for consideration and
in a commercial context.”).
235. McCants v. NCAA, 201 F. Supp. 3d 732, 738, 742 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (citing
Cassell v. Collins, 472 S.E.2d 770, 772 (N.C. 1996)).  The McCants court did note,
however, that the Restatement “may be persuasive in certain contexts.” Id.  See
supra note 182 and accompanying text.
236. Miller v. City of Camden, 494 S.E.2d 813, 815 n.2 (S.C. 1997). See also
Triad Insulation, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., No. 12-1110, 2013 W. Va. LEXIS
768, at *9–*10 (W. Va. 2013) (“We summarily reject petitioners’ request to adopt
[§ 324A] in this case.”).
237. Blake v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 82 P.3d 960, 967 (N.M. 2003) (citing
Gabaldon v. Erisa Mortg. Co., 990 P.2d 197, 203 (N.M. 1999)).
238. Patton v. Simone, 626 A.2d 844, 849 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (citing Furek
v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 515–16, 520 (Del. 1991)).  The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals treats § 324A similarly. See Presley v. Commercial Moving & Rig-
ging Inc., 25 A.3d 873, 889 (D.C. 2011) (applying § 324A directly while comparing
the present facts to Haynesworth); Haynesworth v. DH Stevens Co., 645 A.2d 1095,
1097 (D.C. 1994) (“Although the Restatement has not been formally adopted by
this court, it is clear that the particular concept advanced by [the plaintiff] is well
known and has been readily applied, where appropriate.”); but see Gilbert v. Mi-
odovnik, 990 A.2d 983, 994 n.15 (D.C. 2010) (“We have not adopted § 324A in this
jurisdiction.”).
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ion which perhaps suggests a more favorable view of the provision
by the state in general.239  The Mississippi Supreme Court has not
yet “ruled definitively” on section 324A’s application, though the
court has not heard a case on the provision in a few decades.240
Oregon has also “not formally adopted” section 324A, though a fed-
eral court recently noted that the Oregon courts “have not other-
wise indicated that the rule itself is unsound or would not be
applied under the right circumstances.”241
In Wissel, the Ohio Court of Appeals found that the OHSAA
owed a duty of care to the injured student-athlete due to its rule-
and policy-making influence over the conduct of the student-ath-
lete’s school, which owed “a general duty of reasonable care” to the
student-athlete “in the conduct of its football program.”242  This
safety equipment was governed by the policies of the OHSAA.243
Thus, the court applied section 324A(b) to show that by influenc-
ing the school’s commission of this duty, the OHSAA assumed that
239. See Buyse v. Colonial Sec. Serv., Inc., No. N10C-08-012, 2012 Del. Super.
LEXIS 350, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. July 19, 2012).  The New Jersey Supreme Court
has also not expressly adopted § 324A, but has denied appeals in two cases where
the New Jersey Appellate Division applied § 324A. See Fackelmann v. Lac
d’Amiante du Que., LTEE, 942 A.2d 127, 131–32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)
(citing Jackson v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 400 A.2d 81, 85–86 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.),
cert. denied, 81 N.J. 330 (N.J. 1979)); Viducich v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins., 192 A.2d
596, 598–99 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963), cert. denied, 41 N.J. 129, (N.J. 1963).
Similarly, a 2000 Washington Court of Appeals case noted that § 324A “has not yet
been adopted by a Washington court.”  Meneely v. SR Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49, 58 n.4
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000).  The Washington Supreme Court, however, has cited the
provision twice since then (once in the majority opinion, once in dissent), sug-
gesting at least a tolerance for the application of the doctrine. See Donatelli v. DR
Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 312 P.3d 620, 624 (Wash. 2013); Osborn v. Mason
Cty, 134 P.3d 197, 204 (Wash. 2006) (Chambers, J., dissenting).
240. Hartford Steam Boiler Insp. & Ins. v. Cooper, 341 So. 2d 665, 667 n.1
(Miss. 1977) (“The facts do not bring the present case within Rule 324A and we do
not decide whether or not the rule should be adopted in whole or in part.”). See
also Trosclair v. Bechtel Corp., 653 F.2d 162, 163 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Although Missis-
sippi courts have not ruled definitively, this circuit, following the predictive course
required of it in diversity cases, has held that its courts would impose those duties
on contractors expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, and com-
monly called the Good Samaritan Doctrine.”); Goodwin v. Jackson, 484 So. 2d
1041, 1044 (Miss. 1986) (rejecting plaintiff’s assertion that Mississippi Supreme
Court adopted § 324A).
241. Bixby v. KBR, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1092 n.6 (D. Or. 2012).  Thus,
according to this court’s reasoning, “nothing in Oregon law precludes plaintiffs
from relying upon § 324A to establish the existence of a duty owed to them as
third parties.” Id.
242. Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 605 N.E.2d 458, 465–66 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992). See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
243. See id. at 465.
42
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol25/iss1/1
2018] GRATUITOUS PROMISES 43
standard of care and owed a duty to the student-athlete to ensure
that its policies were reasonably enacted and applied.244
Had section 324A been applied in Lanni similarly to Wissel, the
outcome could conceivably have changed.245  Like in Wissel, the
fencing event organizers in Lanni “allowed the conduct of [the
event] to be largely governed by the policies and decisions” of the
NCAA.246  The NCAA required all fencers seeking to be eligible for
the Regional Championships to have “a minimum of eighteen
bouts ‘played in accordance with NCAA rules,’” and the event in
question was indeed played “in accordance with the NCAA’s rules
for the sport of fencing.”247  These NCAA rules adopted the USFA
rules as the “applicable rules for intercollegiate [fencing] competi-
tions,” and these rules did include requirements for a pipe-and-
drape barrier that were not followed, and thus led to plaintiff
Lanni’s injury.248  With a heavier reliance on section 324A(b), these
facts could be used to show that the NCAA and USFA, by imposing
USFA rules on the fencing competition, adopted the fencing com-
petition’s duty to keep the athletes safe by properly promulgating
and enforcing these rules.249
At the same time, it must be noted that Indiana’s interpreta-
tion of section 324A has a key difference from the text of the Re-
statement. According to the Restatement text, section 324A applies
to anyone “who undertakes gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services. . . .”250 But shortly before Lanni was decided by the
Indiana Court of Appeals, the Indiana Supreme Court stated their
belief that: “[t]o judicially impose liability under a theory of gratui-
tously assumed duty is unwise policy and should be cautiously in-
244. See id. at 465–66.
245. Section 324A was not referred to at all in the Court of Appeals decision
in Lanni. See Lanni v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).  The provision was
referred to in the appellant’s Reply Brief, but only in the context of pointing out
that Indiana (or at least the Indiana Court of Appeals) has recognized the rule as
Indiana law. See Consolidated Reply Brief of Appellant at 16–17, Lanni v. NCAA,
42 N.E.3d 542 (Ind. Ct. App. June 8, 2015) (No. 49A02-1409-CT-649); see also supra
note 233 and accompanying text.  The NCAA appellee brief does not discuss
§ 324A, nor did either party during oral arguments. See Brief of Appellee NCAA,
Lanni v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542 (Ind. Ct. App. May 20, 2015) (No. 49A02-1409-CT-
649); Oral Argument, Lanni v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542 (Ind. Ct. App. July 27, 2015)
(No. 49A02-1409-CT-649), available at http://mycourts.in.gov/arguments/default.
aspx?id=1826&view=detail [https://perma.cc/2HF5-X2E8].
246. Wissel, 605 N.E.2d at 541–42. See Lanni, 42 N.E.3d at 553.
247. Lanni, 42 N.E.3d at 552–53.
248. Id. at 545.
249. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (empha-
sis added).
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voked only in extreme circumstances involving a negligently
performed assumed undertaking.”251  This language was cited spe-
cifically by the NCAA, and the case containing this statement was
relied upon heavily by the Indiana Court of Appeals.252
Further, a major issue for the plaintiff in Lanni was whether, at
the time of her injury, the plaintiff was in her role as a student-
athlete or as a “mere spectator.”253  While the court did not give a
judgment on this question, if she had been found to have been
injured as a spectator her argument would have been weakened sig-
nificantly.254  Based on the facts relied upon by the court and the
questions asked of the plaintiff’s attorney by the judges in oral argu-
ment, it seems fairly clear the court saw the plaintiff’s role as a spec-
tator more than as a student-athlete.255
251. Yost v. Wabash College, 3 N.E.3d 509, 518 (Ind. 2014).
252. See Lanni v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542, 549–53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Brief of
Appellee NCAA at 27, Lanni v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542 (Ind. Ct. App. May 20, 2015)
(No. 49A02-1409-CT-649). See also supra notes 126–128.
253. Lanni, 42 N.E.3d at 546 n.4 (“The parties debate whether Lanni was a
student-athlete or a mere spectator. Lanni’s designated evidence plainly shows that
she was a student-athlete participating in the March 2010 competition, although,
at the time of her injury, she was not actively engaged in a bout.”).
254. It is likely the court did not rule on this question because this would be
an issue of fact, and the ruling was on a motion for summary judgment.  However,
the judges on oral argument probed this question extensively. See infra note 255.
255. See Lanni, 42 N.E.3d at 545 (“According to Robert Dilworth, the Execu-
tive Director of the USFA in March of 2010, this border ‘[u]sually . . . represents a
series of pipes that delineate where spectators may and may not go.’”); id. at 546
(“The Committee ‘suggested that[,] whenever possible, . . . we limit spectators
from walking between the corrals. Spectators could be allowed on the competition
floor around the perimeter of the corrals[ ] but not allowed between the cor-
rals.’”); id. at 554 (“The USFA rules, adopted by the NCAA, define a fencing area
to include a ‘Removable Area,’ which ‘usually represents a series of pipes that de-
lineate where spectators may and may not go.’”); id. (“Shortly after Lanni’s injury,
in May of 2010 the Fencing Committee ‘discussed the layout’ at fencing competi-
tions, ‘expressed concern that the [fencing] strips were too close together,’ and
‘suggested that[,] whenever possible, . . . we limit spectators from walking between
the corrals.’”).  The plaintiff through her allegations was also not terribly effective
at arguing that her role at the time of her injury was as a student-athlete rather
than as a spectator. See id. at 546 (“In particular, Lanni alleged that the NCAA had
acted negligently as follows . . . On or before March 7, 2010, Defendant NCAA was
negligent . . . by failing to undertake hazard and risk analys[e]s prior to the com-
mencement of the Midwest Regional Fencing Competition to insure adequate
safety of spectators watching an event.”) (emphasis added).  In oral arguments,
Judge Ezra H. Friedlander asked the plaintiff’s attorney whether the NCAA would
similarly have a duty to an injured spectator at an Indiana University basketball
game.  Oral Argument at 9:42, Lanni v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542 (Ind. Ct. App. July
27, 2015) (No. 49A02-1409-CT-649), available at http://mycourts.in.gov/argu
ments/default.aspx?id=1826&view=detail [https://perma.cc/R4YX-FAZS].
Lanni’s attorney responded by stating that her situation was different, because of
her relationship with the NCAA as a student-athlete, and thus she is under the
rules of the NCAA. Id. at 10:22.  Later, the plaintiff’s attorney would concede that
at the time of her injury Lanni was acting as a spectator. Id. at 10:58.
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On the other hand, while Mayall and Mehr have similar weak-
nesses that would preclude effective application of the traditional
voluntary undertaking doctrine, their facts suggest that application
of section 324A(b) may have been more appropriate.  As men-
tioned above, the Mayall plaintiff could not—and actually did not
even attempt to—prove detrimental reliance on USA Water Polo’s
rules and oversight, which is a necessary element of the voluntary
undertaking doctrine in California in the absence of a showing that
the defendant’s voluntary undertaking increased the risk of
harm.256  Unless they could show that USA Water Polo voluntarily
undertook a duty owed to Mayall’s daughter through section 324A,
the Mayall plaintiff would also have to show either detrimental reli-
ance or an increased risk of harm resulting from USA Water Polo’s
conduct under section 323.257
But unlike Indiana, California has expressly adopted section
324A in whole—including subpart (b) of the rule as relied upon by
the Ohio Court of Appeals in Wissel.258  In her Second Amended
Complaint, Mayall did cite section 324A and stated that USA Water
Polo “undertook both gratuitously and as a result of the payment of
fees by Plaintiff and the Class members to ‘creat[e] a healthy and
safe environment for our participants.’”259  However, Mayall’s argu-
ment on this theory was based on an alleged “failure to exercise
reasonable care [which] increased the risk of harm” to her daugh-
ter and other purported class members.260  As shown by the dismis-
sal of the Second Amended Complaint, this is likely a losing
argument; a better theory would be to show that by promulgating
health and safety rules—even in a broad sense—USA Water Polo
undertook a general duty of care owed by the event organizers by
sanctioning the events and thereby governing the events through
their policies and decisions.261
256. See Mayall II, No. 8:15-cv-00171-AG-KES, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115047, at
*12 (C.D. Cal. 2016). See also supra note 145 and accompanying text.
257. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
258. See Paz v. State, 994 P.2d 975, 977 (Cal. 2000); Artiglio v. Corning Inc.,
957 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Cal. 1998).  In fact, the dissent in Paz dissented primarily
based on the majority’s failure to consider § 324A(b) in their analysis. See Paz, 994
P.2d at 983 (George, C.J., dissenting) (“[U]nlike the majority I believe that the
developer . . . reasonably could be found to have undertaken to perform a duty
that the city owed to the users of the intersection . . . thus supporting liability of
the developer under the second condition set forth in 324A.”).
259. Second Amended Complaint at 49, Mayall II, No. 8:15-cv-00171-AG-KES,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115047 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
260. Id. at 50.
261. See Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 605 N.E.2d 458, 465 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992). See also supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.  USA Water
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The same could apply to Mehr, though it would be a much
weaker argument.  Hypothetically, based on the wide array of rela-
tionships between the various defendants and unnamed event or-
ganizers, a connection could be found between the plaintiffs and
defendants.  The issues in Mehr are very similar to those in Mayall ’s
Second Amended Complaint, as the Mehr plaintiffs’ arguments also
skirt very close to the inherent risk of the game argument.262  Addi-
tionally, like Mayall, Mehr was filed in California, meaning that sec-
tion 324A(b) is adopted law in the governing state.263
But while the Mehr plaintiffs cited section 324A in their plead-
ing documents, like in Mayall, they argued that the defendants’ ac-
tions “have increased the risk of harm to [the plaintiffs] and
members of the putative class” rather than arguing that their con-
duct constituted an adoption of the duty owed by event organizers
through their influence over the game.264  Granted, the plaintiffs in
Mehr would have significant difficulties establishing a Wissel-like link
between the plaintiffs and U.S. Soccer, since their argument is
Polo does not have specific health and safety rules for its sanctioned events. See
supra note 75. The Mayall plaintiff-appellant did not cite § 324A in her opening
brief at the Ninth Circuit, and instead is thus far continuing to rely on the § 323
voluntary undertaking doctrine on appeal. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 55–60,
Mayall v. USA Water Polo, Inc., No. 16-56389, 2017 WL 1356242 (9th Cir. Apr. 5,
2017) (No. 11).
262. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant FIFA’s Motion to Dismiss at
21–22, Mehr v. Fe´deration Intern. de Football Ass’n, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1035 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 20, 2015) (No. 14-cv-3879-PJH).
This is an issue about what happens after a concussion or likely concus-
sion occurs. FIFA misses the point when it cites inapposite cases solely
focused on an activity itself, not medical care issues that occur after the
activity.  This is a fundamental distinction that undermines all Defend-
ants’ motions to dismiss.
Id.
263. See Paz, 994 P.2d at 977 (“[T]he section 324A theory of liability . . . is a
settled principle firmly rooted in the common law of negligence.”). See supra note
241.
264. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant US Soccer Federation Inc.’s Motion
to Dismiss at 20, Mehr v. Fe´deration Intern. de Football Ass’n, 115 F. Supp. 3d
1035 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015) (No. 14-cv-3879-PJH). See also Plaintiffs’ Opposition
to Defendant USYSA’s Motion to Dismiss at 10–11, Mehr v. Fe´deration Intern. de
Football Ass’n, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1035 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015) (No. 14-cv-3879-
PJH).
Plaintiffs also adequately allege that USYSA’s actions have increased the
risk to them and members of the putative class by, as discussed in more
detail above, knowingly disregarding medical research and best practices
regarding treatment of concussions and sub-concussive hits.  So Plaintiffs
stated a valid claim for breach of voluntary undertaking under both theo-
ries of voluntary undertaking.
Id.  The opposition briefs for the other defendants refer back to these two briefs
for these arguments, and focus more on issues more directly applicable to those
defendants.
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based on the rather weak argument that “[i]t was reasonable and
foreseeable to . . . U.S. Soccer that their failures would flow down-
stream to the Rules and Laws of the Game enacted by other organi-
zations, including the other [d]efendants in this action.”265  But
given the successful arguments made in Wissel and the fact that
plaintiffs’ main argument was based entirely on the defendants’ in-
fluence on event organizers and the downstream defendants, rely-
ing on section 324A(b) would have likely been the stronger
argument.
Finally, even though the plaintiffs in Hill did not win based on
section 324A, their victory adds to the flexibility of this theory.  The
court in Hill found a direct relationship between the deceased stu-
dent-athlete and the NCAA because the testing was directly man-
dated and conducted by the NCAA, but the court’s analysis shows
that the plaintiffs likely could have prevailed on section 324A as
well.266  The court noted in their analysis that the plaintiffs had
pleaded that “the NCAA owed a duty of care to Mr. Hill because he
was a student at Slippery Rock University,” thus showing a likeli-
hood that the plaintiffs could have survived a motion to dismiss
based on section 324A(b).267 Hill also shows the potential applica-
bility of section 324A(a), as it establishes precedent in Pennsylvania
that when overseeing athletic organizations inconsistently apply
policy and initiate medical and physical evaluations that do not test
for everything that they are expected to test for, it may constitute an
increased risk of harm as well.268
V. CONCLUSION
Even though the analysis of Wissel v. Ohio High School Athletic
Association is now twenty-five years old, the six cases presented in
this Article show that the case’s unique use of section 324A(b) was
well ahead of its time.  After over two decades without a similar case
to test these theories, six cases in a sixteen-month span all
presented facts conducive to potentially holding overseeing athletic
organizations to a duty of care based on their promulgation of
health and safety rules.
While these six cases have yet to force a court to apply section
324A(b), the analysis presented in this Article shows the flexibility
of this theory.  While the application of section 324A(b) will likely
265. Mehr v. US Soccer, et al., 115 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
266. See Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., 138 A.3d 673, 680 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
267. Id. at 679.
268. Id. at 679–80.
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not be successful in states where the applicability of section
324A(b) has been limited (like Indiana and North Carolina), the
analysis established in Wissel may have been a better option for the
plaintiffs in Mehr and Mayall.269  An application of this theory can
take the facts of a case outside of the spectrum of applicability of
the traditional voluntary undertaking doctrine established in these
cases, and thus allow a plaintiff to prevail despite not being able to
show an increased risk of harm or detrimental reliance—as re-
quired by section 323.270
Moreover, as time passes more cases will present opportunities
to test these theories.  As more plaintiffs continue to attempt to
hold various different defendants accountable for failures in draft-
ing and enforcing concussion protocols and policy, many will look
to more creative theories.
Further, health and safety issues will always continue to arise in
unexpected ways, and plaintiffs will look to hold overseeing entities
accountable for either not foreseeing the potentialities of these is-
sues or for creating an increased risk through action or inaction.
For example, it is seemingly only a matter of time before a student-
athlete is seriously injured due to a lack of a cohesive policy to con-
trol fans storming the court after a major victory, or for ensuring
that the field or court is safe.271  As these issues arise, the courts will
need to decide whether section 324A(b) can apply to hold the over-
seeing athletic organizations who take on the role of promulgating
health and safety rules to a duty of care for this responsibility.
Much of the court’s analysis in Wissel was based on the judges’
disbelief that the “organizations whose rules govern the contest and
whose discussions determine the type of athletic equipment that
the athletes are provided do not owe those athletes a duty of rea-
269. See supra notes 258–265.  For a discussion of section 324A(b)’s applicabil-
ity in Indiana, see supra notes 250–252.  For a discussion of section 324A(b)’s appli-
cability in North Carolina, see supra note 235.
270. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
271. See Lanni v. NCAA, 42 N.E.3d 542, 553 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (discussing
safety of student-athletes at athletic events); Winneker & Ehrlich, supra note 71, at
27 (discussing risk of injuries to student-athletes due to fans storming court).  Fur-
ther, the NCAA’s continued allowance of cameramen to sit a few feet from the
sidelines during basketball games may result in injuries, as it has in NBA games.
Matt Zemek, College Basketball in Focus: Cameras Are Too Close to the Court, COMEBACK
(June 12, 2015), http://thecomeback.com/thestudentsection/basketball/college-
basketball-in-focus-cameras-are-too-close-to-the-court.html [https://perma.cc/
7GZC-7RL4]. See also Joshua D. Winneker, Philip Schultze & Sam C. Ehrlich,
Lights, Camera, . . . Injury! The NBA Needs to Ban Courtside Cameramen, 23 JEFFREY S.
MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 437 (2016).
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sonable care in their activities.”272  The precedent established by
that skepticism has not yet been tested further.  But as the relation-
ship between athletes and these overseeing athletic organizations
continues to evolve, it is only a matter of time before a court de-
cides definitively whether these rules and policy is an assumption of
a duty of care under section 324A, or whether they are simply
promises to “act gratuitously and for noble purposes” in keeping
their athletes safe from harm.
272. Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 605 N.E.2d 458, 465 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992).
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